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1 Some puzzles
I’m no modal realist myself, mind, and I don’t think you should be
either. But it can be important to know how best to do something you
have no intention of doing. Modal realism plays a pivotal role in the
space of available views about modality: our understanding of that
space will be seriously incomplete unless we understand how modal
realism can best be made coherent.
You probably think that David Lewis has already made it
coherent—On the Plurality of Worlds (Lewis 1986: henceforth OPW)
stands for many of us as an exemplar of the internal virtues towards
which one might aspire in a systematic metaphysics, whatever we
may think about the plausibility of the result. I think this judgment
needs refining. The book contains the outlines of a marvellously co-
herent and elegant (albeit otherwise implausible) account of modality
and many other subject matters. But it also contains various bits
of doctrine that just don’t fit with this picture, including some that
might have seemed quite central. My goal in this paper is to track
down these aberrant elements and show how the view works once
they are eliminated.
Let me begin with some puzzles for Lewis. They are not particularly
deep: in fact, the correct solution to all three will probably jump out
at you long before I have presented it. But they will help us begin
to figure out what is really central to the modal realist’s analysis of
possibility and necessity.
While the most general statement of this analysis is a bit compli-
cated, its application in some simple cases is supposed to be quite
straightforward. For example, we have the following analyses:
(1) It is possible that some swans are blue↔df there is a Lewis-
world such that some swans in it are blue.
(2) It is possible that no swans are blue ↔df there is a Lewis-
world such that no swans in it are blue.
Here, a Lewis-world is a cosmos: according to Lewis’s final analysis,
an object none of whose parts bears any “analogically spatiotemporal”
relation to anything disjoint from it, and which is not part of any other
such object.
The symbol ‘↔df’ in (1) and (2) is supposed to indicate the giving
of an analysis. Perhaps it may be rendered in English as ‘For it to be
the case that. . . is for it to be the case that. . . ’. If we have any grip
at all on what it means to give an analysis of something, we know
that pφ ↔df ψq entails pNecessarily, φ iff ψq. If this is given up, it
becomes entirely unclear how the meaning of (1) and (2) go beyond
the meaning of the corresponding material biconditionals.1 So in
particular, (1) entails (1′):
1Is pφ↔df ψq just equivalent to p(φ↔ ψ)q? There is pressure for Lewis to answer
yes: it wouldn’t be so exciting if one could analyse modality, counterfactuals, etc. in
nonmodal terms but still had to take ‘↔df’ as a primitive, manifestly non-extensional,
operator. If one does answer yes, one will presumably have a pragmatic story to tell
about why claims like ‘For Socrates to be wise is for Socrates to be wise and not to
be a round square’ sound wrong.
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(1′) Necessarily: it is possible that some swans are blue iff there
is a Lewis-world such that some swans in it are blue.
Puzzle 1 depends on (1′) alone. Intuitively, it is possible that no
swans should be blue; this is the kind of intuitive modal judgment that
Lewis strove to accept. It seems almost as obvious that it is possible
for there to be contingently no blue swans—i.e. that it is possible that:
no swans are blue even though it is possible that some swans are blue.
But given (1′), for this to be possible, it would have to be possible that:
no swans are blue even though some swans in some Lewis-world
are blue.2 And this cannot be, since any blue swan that is parts of a
Lewis-world is a blue swan. Was Lewis really committed to denying
that there could have contingently been no blue swans?
Puzzle 2 depends on the combination of (1′) with (2). As we saw
in Puzzle 1, (1′) entails that if it is possible that no swans are blue, it
is possible that it is not possible that some swans are blue. Suppose
that—as Lewis believed—some Lewis-worlds contain blue swans and
others don’t. Then by (2), it is possible that no swans are blue, and
hence by (1′), it is possible that it is not possible that some swans
are blue. But it is possible that some swans are blue, by (1). This
combination of claims is inconsistent in the modal logic S5, where
what is possibly necessary is simply necessary, and what is possibly
impossible is simply impossible. It is thus puzzling to find it seeming
to follow so directly from Lewis’s commitments. For Lewis generally
seems to be friendly towards S5, at least when the modal operators are
interpreted as expressing metaphysical necessity and possibility and
the sentences we are dealing with are “de dicto” or “purely qualitative”,
as ‘there are blue swans’ and ‘there are no blue swans’ are supposed
to be.
Puzzle 3 requires us to generalise the pattern of which (1) and (2)
are instances. The schema seems straightforward:
(3) It is possible that Q Fs are Gs↔df there is a Lewis world such
that Q Fs in it are Gs.
Here ‘Q’ is to be replaced with a quantifier like ‘some’ or ‘many’ or
‘at least two’, and ‘F’ and ‘G’ with predicates expressing qualitative
2The argument here is of the evidently valid form (φ↔ ψ),^(ξ∧φ) ` ^(ξ∧ψ).
properties. Since ‘Lewis-world’ is itself such a predicate, (4) is an
instance of (3):
(4) It is possible that at least two things are Lewis-worlds ↔df
there is a Lewis-world such that at least two things in it are
Lewis-worlds.3
But it follows from the definition of ‘Lewis-world’ that no Lewis-
world contains any other Lewis-world. So if we accept (4), we have
to say that it is not possible that at least two things are Lewis-worlds.
This sits strangely, to say the least, with Lewis’s further claim that at
least two things—infinitely many things, in fact—are Lewis-worlds.
Whatever is the case could be the case: this is a version of the modal
axiom T, and it is obviously correct.4 So it looks like (4) must be
rejected; but then what principled grounds could there be for holding
on to (1) and (2)?.5
2 Unrestricted and restricted quantification
A resolution of these puzzles must, I think, involve the familiar idea
that quantification is sometimes tacitly restricted. You can say ‘there
is no beer’ and assert nothing false even if there is beer but none of
it is in your house, or even if there is beer in your house but only
in the form of a puddle of spilt beer on the floor of the fridge. You
can say ‘there are no blue swans’ and assert nothing false even if,
3There is some direct evidence that Lewis accepted (4): for example, at OPW 16
he writes that ‘it is not the case that, possibly, two worlds differ in their laws without
differing in their distribution of local qualitative character’ is equivalent to ‘there is no
world wherein two worlds differ in their laws without differing in their distribution
of local qualitative character’. He goes on to point out that ‘That’s trivial—there is
no world wherein two worlds do anything’.
4Hudson (1997) and Parsons (2009) also note the apparent failure of T induced
by Lewis’s analysis.
5It doesn’t help to point out that ‘Lewis-world’ is defined using quantifiers, and
to require that these quantifiers should also get restricted. If w is a Lewis-world
and x an object in w none of whose parts in w bears any analogically spatiotemporal
relation to anything in w disjoint from x, then x must be w: this follows from classical
mereology and the premise that one cannot bear an anologically spatiotemporal
relation to the fusion of some objects to which one bears no such relations.
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as Lewis believed, there are blue swans but none of them is in our
Lewis-world.6
The natural thing to say about the puzzles is that the analyses in
the previous section involve a mixture of restricted and unrestricted
quantification. In the analysis-schema
(3) It is possible that Q Fs are Gs↔df there is a Lewis world such
that Q Fs in it are Gs.
the quantifier Q on the left is some kind of restricted quantifier—
section 4 will discuss what the restriction might be—while both the
quantifiers on the right (Q and ‘there is’) are unrestricted.
This reading makes the puzzles go away. Let us use the subscript u
to indicate unrestricted quantification, and r to indicate the relevant
kind of restriction.
Puzzle 1: the intended reading of (1) does not make ‘possibly somer
swans are blue’ inconsistent with ‘nor swans are blue’. Thus it is
consistent with the truth of ‘Possibly, there are contingently nor blue
swans’.
Puzzle 2: for the same reason, the intended reading of (2) does not
license the inference from ‘Possibly, nor swans are blue’ to ‘Possibly,
it is not possible that somer swans are blue’. So the inference to the
S5-inconsistent ‘Possibly there are no blue swans, and possibly, it is
not possible for there to be blue swans’ (on either interpretation) is
blocked.
Puzzle 3: (4) tells us that it is not possible that there be at least twor
Lewis-worlds. It follows by T that there is at most oner Lewis-world.
But this is consistent with Lewis’s claim that there are infinitely manyu
Lewis-worlds.
So provided we understand the analyses of section 1 as analy-
ses of possibility claims involving restricted quantification, trouble is
6The question how, if at all, the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction
fits into compositional semantics is not germane to my purposes. I will write as if it
involves a semantic context-sensitivity in the quantifiers; but everything I say should
be acceptable, mutatis mutandis, to those (e.g. Stanley and Szabó 2000) who locate
the context-sensitivity in the noun, or some silent syntactic element connected to the
noun, and to those (e.g. Bach 1994) who regard the phenomenon as pragmatic rather
than semantic.
averted. But this response raises a further question. Given that ‘some’
in ‘some swans are blue’ admits of both unrestricted and restricted
readings, it follows from a plausible principle of compositionality
that ‘some’ in ‘it is possible that some swans are blue’ also admits
of both kinds of readings. So how should we analyse ‘Possibly Q Fs
are Gs’ when Q is taken as unrestricted? Any general programme
for analysing the modal in terms of the non-modal had better have
something to say about this.
In the case where Q is ‘some’, our response to this question is effec-
tively determined: ‘possibly someu Fs are Gs’ is necessarily equivalent
to ‘someu Fs are Gs’. The right-to-left direction follows from T. As for
the left-to-right direction, if we had some workable analysis of ‘pos-
sibly someu Fs are Gs’ on which it was consistent with ‘nou Fs are Gs’,
why on earth would we not use the same trick to give an analysis of
‘possibly somer Fs are Gs’ on which it was consistent with ‘nou Fs are
Gs’?
It is not yet completely obvious that the modal realist should regard
‘possibly Qu Fs are G’ as equivalent in every case to ‘Qu Fs are Gs’.
One could imagine analyses according to which it is possible that nou
swans are blue, even if in fact some swans are blue. For example, we
could propose that
(5) Possibly, Qu Fs are Gs↔df someu appropriate part of reality
is such that Qu Fs in it are Gs.
What are the “appropriate” parts of reality? For T to be valid, the
whole of reality had better count as an appropriate part. We could
say that the only other appropriate parts are Lewis-worlds.7 But this
restriction seems arbitrary: if there could beu many Lewis worlds,
and there could be exactly one, what grounds are there for denying
that there could be two, or any other intermediate number? The best
version of (5) would, I think, at least allow arbitrary fusions of ap-
propriate parts of reality to be themselves appropriate.8 But any such
7This is the “T-preserving analysis” discussed by Parsons (2009).
8Bricker (2001) endorses something like (5) with ‘appropriate’ interpreted to
mean ‘fusion of Lewis-worlds’, but he does not intend it as an analysis of possibility
claims involving absolutely unrestricted quantifiers. I will discuss his theory of the
relevant kind of restriction in section 4 below.
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view still strikes me as pointless. If anything short of reality as a
whole counts as “appropriate”, we will no longer have an S5 modal
logic, even for claims involving just unrestricted quantification and
qualitative predicates. For example, if there is an appropriate part that
lacks blue swans, then it is possible that nou swans be blue, and hence
possible that it is not possible that someu swans be blue. Endorsing
such a claim for the sake of being able to agree with ordinary people
when they claim that it is possible that nou swans are blue seems like
a bad trade. For the modal realist is already committed to rejecting
many common-sense modal claims involving unrestricted quantifica-
tion, e.g. the claim that it is possible that it is contingently the case
that nou swans are blue. It would be perverse to jettison compelling
logical principles just in order to slightly decrease the scope of this
systematic disagreement.
I conclude that the best option for the modal realist is to hold that
‘Possibly, Qu Fs are Gs’ is equivalent in every case to ‘Qu Fs are Gs’.
And if we say this, I can see no grounds for resisting the follow-
ing obvious generalisation: whenever φ is a sentence built up from
qualitative predicates, unrestricted quantifiers and truth-functional
operators, pPossibly φq and pNecessarily φq are both equivalent to φ.9
One might attempt to avoid this conclusion by giving up the “plau-
sible principle of compositionality” alluded to above, and denying
that sentences of the form ‘Possibly Q Fs are G’ even admit readings
on which the quantifier is unrestricted. The setup in ‘Counterpart
Theory and Quantified Modal Logic’ (Lewis 1968) may suggest such
a view. There, the project of reducing modality is cast as one of finding
translations from one formal language, containing modal operators,
into another, which lacks them. The latter is not just the modality-free
fragment of the former, since even sentences that lack modal opera-
tors are translated non-homophonically. For example, the sentence
9Divers (1999) seems to agree: ‘Whenever the possibility operator expresses a
non-trivial semantic function on quantificational sentences it is, indeed, always that
of altering the scope of formerly world-restricted quantifiers’ (229). The class of
sentences on which Divers thinks the possibility operator operates only trivially is,
however, wider than this, including, for example, subject-predicate sentences where
the subject is an object that is not part of any Lewis-world. Section 6 will make it
clear why I think this is a mistake.
‘∃xFx’ of the modal language is translated as ‘∃x(Ix@ ∧ Fx)’ (‘Ix@’
means ‘x is in the actual world’). This suggests that the modal lan-
guage lacks unrestricted quantifiers. If one thought that this formal
language was capable of representing every admissible interpretation
of English sentences involving modality, one would be pushed to the
view that quantifiers in English cannot be interpreted as unrestricted
when they occur in the scope of a modal operator.
But such a prohibition is quite unmotivated. If unrestricted quantifi-
cation were a rare practice engaged in only by philosophical initiates,
the idea that this special way of talking cannot combine with the ordi-
nary meanings of modal operators might have some plausibility. But
in fact, ordinary people hold and express lots of opinions about what
there is, unrestrictedly speaking. For example, they are fairly confi-
dent that nou swans are blue, and very confident that nou bachelors
are married. Lewis, of course, thinks that many ordinary negative
judgments involving unrestricted quantification are wrong. But if or-
dinary people can express unrestricted quantification when they say
things like ‘no swans are blue’, surely they can also express unre-
stricted quantification when they say things like ‘it is possible that no
swans are white’ and ‘it is necessary that no bachelors are married’.
Since Lewis thinks that many ordinary nonmodal claims involving
unrestricted quantification are false, it would not be surprising if he
thought that many ordinary claims involving unrestricted quantifica-
tion under modal operators (e.g. ‘Possibly, nou swans are white’) are
also false. Ordinary usage gives no support at all to the claim that
such readings are semantically prohibited.
3 Exegetical interlude
Did Lewis agree that modal operators are vacuous when applied
to sentences built up from unrestricted quantifiers and qualitative
predicates? There is one salient piece of evidence that suggests that
he did not. In OPW §1.2, we are told that ‘possibly there are blue
swans iff, for some world W, at W there are blue swans’, where ‘at W’
‘works mainly by restricting the domains of quantifiers in its scope, in
much the same way that the restricting modifier “in Australia” does’
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(OPW 5). This suggests that ‘at W’ can apply restrictions even when it
is applied to a sentence that doesn’t come with its own restriction, so that
‘at W, Qu Fs are Gs’ means the same as ‘Qu Fs which are in W are Gs’.
If so, ‘At some Lewis-world W, no swans are blue’, and hence also
‘Possibly no swans are blue’, will be true even when the quantifier is
read unrestrictedly.10
On the other hand, Lewis shows no signs of endorsing any of the
puzzling claims that—as we saw in section 1—follow from analyses
like (1) and (2) when all the quantifiers are taken as unrestricted.11
And there are several passages in which Lewis directly addresses the
modal status of claims built up from unrestricted quantification and
qualitative predicates, which suggest that such claims are necessary
when true. Here is one example:
Our contingent knowledge that there are donkeys at our
world requires causal acquaintance with the donkeys, or
at least with what produces them. Our necessary knowledge
that there are donkeys at some worlds—even talking don-
keys, donkeys with dragons as worldmates, and what have
10There is a complication: ‘I do not suppose that [restrictive modifiers] must
restrict all quantifiers in their scope, without exception. “In Australia, there is a
yacht faster than any other” would mean less than it does if the modifier restricted
both quantifiers rather than just the first. . . . [A] lot is left up to the pragmatic rule that
what is said should be interpreted so as to be sensible’ (OPW 6). This suggests that
sentences involving restricting modifiers, including modal operators, have a range
of readings, which differ as regards which quantifiers get restricted. If so, then ‘In
W there are many Lewis-worlds’ and ‘Possibly there are many Lewis-worlds’ have
readings on which they are both equivalent to ‘There are many Lewis-worlds’, as
well as readings on which they are trivially false. It is easy to imagine a pragmatic
story about why we would tend to prefer the former readings. This takes some of the
sting out of Puzzle 3. But I don’t think it does enough: the inference from pPossibly
φq to φ seems valid, and that should mean, I think, that it is truth-preserving on all
uniform readings.
11At OPW 211, Lewis sounds like he is rejecting T, at least for some notion of
possibility: ‘I do not deny the existence of trans-world individuals, and yet there is
a sense in which I say that they cannot possibly exist.’ On the other hand, imme-
diately afterwards he says ‘As should be expected, the sense in question involves
restricted quantification.’ This implicates that there is another sense in which ‘trans-
world individuals can possibly exist’ is true, and that this sense involves unrestricted
quantification.
you—does not require causal acquaintance either with the
donkeys or with what produces them. (OPW 112)
This presupposes that it is necessary that there are donkeys at some
worlds, and thus that it is necessary that there are donkeys, unrestrict-
edly speaking. (It also suggests, interestingly, that the true reading of
‘it is contingent that there are donkeys’ is equivalent to ‘there are don-
keys at our world’—more of this anon.) In a similar vein, Lewis says
that ‘reality might have been different’ is not true, if we understand
‘reality’ in such a way as to make ‘reality is the totality of everything’
true (OPW 101, note 1). And in Lewis 1996, he accepts without demur
the attribution to him of a theory that ‘treat[s] all statements about
modal reality as non-contingent: if any such statement is possibly
true, then it is true simpliciter’.
4 Contingency-inducing quantification as de re restricted quantifi-
cation
According to the best version of modal realism, whenφ is a closed sen-
tence built up from qualitative predicates and quantifiers, pPossibly
φq and pNecessarily φq can differ in truth value from φ only when the
quantifiers in φ are understood as somehow restricted. But obviously
not just any restriction would suffice to introduce contingency. For an
implicitly restricted quantifier to contribute anything, it must enable
us to express claims distinct from anything that could be spelled out
using unrestricted quantifiers and qualitative predicates. What, then,
is the non-qualitative kind of restriction that makes for contingency?
Since ‘qualitative’ is generally used in contrast to ‘de re’, the obvious
answer is that the relevant restrictions are those that involve some de
re component. For example, one might utter the sentence ‘there are
no blue swans’ and thereby express what one could equally well have
expressed more explicitly by saying ‘there are no blue swans on Earth’.
If we have a theory of the meaning of ‘It is contingent whether there
are blue swans on Earth’ that explains how it can be true, we can
adapt this theory to explain how ‘It is contingent whether there are
blue swans’ can be true, on the relevant restricted reading. Lewis’s
counterpart theory is such a theory. According to it, for it to be
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contingent whether there are blue swans on Earth is for there to be
blue swans on some but not all of Earth’s counterparts.
It will be convenient to have a name for the Lewis-world of which
we are part: call it ‘Cosmo’. One thing we could mean by saying ‘there
are no blue swans’ is that there are no blue swans in Cosmo. On the
approach I am proposing, this is just another case of quantification
with a de re restriction. There is no reason to think that ordinary
people often restrict their quantifiers in this particular way: typically,
when quantifiers are restricted at all, the restriction will be something
much stronger. Be that as it may, when quantifiers restricted to things
in Cosmo occur within the scope of modal operators, our analysis
of the result will take the same form as it would for any other de re
restriction. If our analysis of ‘It is possible that some swans on Earth
are blue’ is ‘Some swans on some counterpart of Earth are blue’, our
analysis of ‘It is possible that some swans in Cosmo are blue’ must
be ‘Some swans in some counterpart of Cosmo are blue’; this is also
our analysis of ‘It is possible that some swans are blue’ on the reading
where the quantifier is restricted to things in Cosmo. We might think
that necessarily, the counterparts of Cosmo are all and only the Lewis-
worlds; if so, we will recover (1), since we will regard ‘some swans
in some counterpart of Cosmo are blue’ as equivalent to ‘there is a
Lewis-world such that some swans in it are blue’. But this will be
due not to some special role played by the concept of a Lewis-world
in the analysis of possibility claims in general, but to the distinctive
behaviour of the counterpart relation as applied to Lewis-worlds.
I think that identifying contingency-inducing quantification with
de re restricted quantification is the right strategy for the modal real-
ist. It is independently plausible that quantification is often subject to
tacit de re restrictions, and modal realists need a theory of de re con-
tingency anyway. So there is no clear motivation to set out on a quest
for some non-qualitative, non-de re account of contingency-inducing
quantification. Nevertheless, in the next section I will consider some
forms such an account might take, and argue that they are all deeply
problematic.
5 Alternative accounts of contingency-inducing quantification
What alternatives are there to identifying contingency-inducing quan-
tification with de re restricted quantification? One possible view
would be to think of ‘Possibly’ as a quantifier binding a hidden vari-
able (ranging over Lewis-worlds), whose value is supplied ‘deicti-
cally’, by the context, when it is not bound. On this picture, the
context-independent semantic value of ‘no swans are blue’ is like that
of the open sentence ‘no swans in w are blue’—something like a func-
tion from variable-assignments to propositions. When the sentence is
uttered on its own, a specific value must be assigned to this variable.
When it is embedded under a modal operator, on the other hand, a
new kind of reading becomes available in which the variable is bound.
Analogously, when ‘he is clever’ is embedded under ‘everyone is sure
that. . . ’, it admits of a kind of interpretation which doesn’t correspond
to any possible interpretation of the unembedded sentence.
I don’t think this semantic theory should be attractive to Lewis-
style modal realists. For it would be completely implausible to posit a
hidden world variable in ‘no swans are blue’ but not in ‘no swans on
Earth are blue’. But the idea that unembedded utterances of the latter
sentence require deictic reference to a specific Lewis-world fits very
poorly with Lewis’s account of the kind of thing Earth is. According
to Lewis, Earth is “worldbound”: if there are no blue swans on it,
then that’s just how things are, simpliciter. Perhaps we can also make
sense of the claim that there are no blue swans on Earth “at” this or
that Lewis-world, by analysing this claim in terms of counterparts.
But there is also the unrelativised proposition that no swans on Earth
are blue, which we can (and presumably do) express when we say ‘no
swans on Earth are blue’.
The un-Lewisian kind of “modal realism” that postulates hidden
world variables all over the place, even in atomic sentences, is cer-
tainly a serious alternative to the kind of modal realism I am trying
to develop. This view is the modal analogue of the familiar B-theory
of time. Just as B-theorists hold that propositions aren’t the sorts of
things that can be true temporarily, so this view holds that proposi-
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tions aren’t the sorts of things that can be true contingently.12 A full
investigation of this view is beyond the scope of this paper. But let
me briefly indicate my reasons for suspecting that it will fall into inco-
herence. There is pressure to treat modal operators and propositional
attitude verbs like ‘believe’ and ‘assert’ as broadly analogous—in par-
ticular, to regard the attitude verbs as variable binders if one regards
modal operators as such. For one thing, we have sentences like ‘It is
both necessary, and universally believed, that no bachelors are mar-
ried’, which seem to require a uniform treatment for the two kinds of
construction. But the treatment of attitude verbs as variable-binders
seems to me to be incoherent. For if there is such a thing as believing
or asserting that no swans on Earth are blue, as opposed to believ-
ing asserting that at w no swans on Earth are blue for some specific w,
then surely this is something ordinary English speakers sometimes do
when they sincerely and literally utter ‘no swans on Earth are blue’.
And in that case, it is just not true that asserting this sentence requires
deictically assigning a value to a free variable. Neither is it true that
this sentence can only be evaluated for truth relative to a variable-
assignment (or a world). For if there is such a thing as believing that
there are no swans on Earth simpliciter, there must also be such a thing
as believing that ‘there are no swans on Earth’ is true simpliciter, i.e.
evaluating it as true simpliciter. So the central point of the analogy
with ‘he is clever’ breaks down.13
Let us assume, then, that the distinctive contingency-inducing form
of restriction (which we continue to indicate with the subscript r)
can attach even to unembedded uses of quantifiers. For the sake of
a concrete example, suppose that nor swans are blue, even though
someu swans are blue. Here is the question I want to press. Consider
a person, Twin, who is generally similar to me as regards his intrinsic
and environmental properties, but who happens to be part of a Lewis-
world—Cosmo-Prime—which also contains blue swans. Suppose I
say ‘some swans are blue’, and thereby say (falsely) that somer swans
12Cf. Williamson (2002) on views which reject “genuine contingency”.
13But see the discussion of ‘the relativist option’ later in this section for a so-
phisticated attempt to make an explanatorily important notion of relative truth live
side-by-side with an unrelativised concept of truth.
are blue. When Twin says ‘some swans are blue’ under analogous
circumstances, does he also say that somer swans are blue?
There is a compelling argument that he does not. We have assumed
that
(6) Nor swans are blue.
It is a basic principle about falsehood, which should be acceptable in
any context, that
(7) If nor swans are blue, the proposition that somer swans are
blue is false.
But it seems obvious that
(8) When Twin says ‘some swans are blue’, he says nothing false.
When people in Cosmo-Prime see blue swans swimming around and
say ‘some swans are blue!’, the belief they thereby express is (usually)
paradigmatically justified by ordinary perceptual methods. Are we
supposed to think of Cosmo-Prime as a place of epistemic tragedy,
where following these rational methods leads one to form systemat-
ically false beliefs? Surely not; hence (8). But (6), (7) and (8) jointly
entail that
(9) When Twin says ‘some swans are blue’, he doesn’t say that
somer swans are blue.
If one follows this kind of reasoning where it leads, one will end
up thinking that the practice of using the sentence ‘some swans are
blue’ to mean that somer swans are blue is more or less confined to
Cosmo. People in other Lewis-worlds, even ones in most respects
similar Cosmo, do not express the very same propositions that we
express when they use contingency-inducing quantifiers.
It would be a bad mistake to confuse (9) with the counterfactual
claim that if I had been spatiotemporally related to blue swans but
otherwise qualitatively similar to the way I actually am, I would not
have used ‘some swans are blue’ to say that somer swans are blue.
There are lots things that people in other Lewis-worlds never do that
I would have done even if I had been qualitatively different in all
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kinds of ways. For example, no-one in any other Lewis-world lives
on Earth. But my living on Earth is counterfactually robust: there is
a wide range of qualitative properties which I lack, such that I would
still live on Earth even if I had them.14
The “pictorial ersatzism” attacked in OPW §3.3 is a view on which
(8) and (9) both fail. There is a property “vim”, which we often
use in restricting our quantifiers. Cosmo and its parts have vim; other
Lewis-worlds don’t. Vim could have been distributed differently with
respect to ordinary qualitative properties. You don’t have to have vim
to be a swan, or to be a person, to have beliefs, etc: thus analyses in
the mould of (3) can still be extensionally adequate. It is reasonable
for us to be highly confident that we have vim. It is also reasonable for
the many people who lack vim to be highly confident that they have
vim. But they are just wrong. The vimless part of reality is a place of
pervasive epistemic tragedy, where good reasoning leads people to
form systematically false beliefs about the distribution of vim.15
This is not an attractive view. Applying the epistemological stan-
dards that normally apply to the postulation of new primitive entities
or properties, there seems to be no justification for postulating vim
at all, or, assuming its existence, for believing anything very specific
about its distribution. Of course, it is part of the view that these
are the wrong standards to apply, since the epistemology of vim is
quite different from the epistemology of any other property. But an
implausible metaphysics is not generally made better by being com-
14Section 8 below will discuss the analysis of “multiply de re” modal claims like ‘I
could live on Earth while being 5 feet tall’.
15Phillip Bricker’s view (2001, 2006) is similar in many ways to the one just
described. One difference is that he does not rule out the possibility that more
than one Lewis-world has vim (he calls it “actuality”). The other difference is more
important: according to Bricker, people who are qualitatively like us but lack vim are
not in a position to refer to vim when we do. On his preferred version of the view,
when we express propositions about the distribution of vim, qualitatively similar
but vimless people fail to express anything. The vimless part of reality is a place of
epistemic tragedy; but the tragedy is not that good reasoning leads to false beliefs,
but that it leads to contentless attempts at thought. (8) and (9) are thus true, assuming
Twin lacks vim.
Bricker’s central argument for going down this route is his rejection of Lewis’s
doctrine of the indexicality of actuality. In section 11 below, I will argue that this is
one of the parts of Lewis’s view that should be jettisoned in any case.
bined with an implausible epistemology, one tenet of which is that the
metaphysics is something it is reasonable to believe. Things might be
different if striking theoretical simplifications could be achieved by
taking vim to be involved in the analysis of our ordinary beliefs; but
it is obscure what the theoretical benefits are supposed to be.
If we understand contingency-inducing quantification as de re re-
stricted quantification, we should be happy to accept (9). For on this
view, to say that somer swans are blue is to say that some swans on
Earth are blue, or that some swans in Cosmo are blue, or some such
thing. This isn’t the sort of thing we should expect to find people at
other Lewis-worlds doing very often. For one thing, saying that some
swans on Earth are blue seems to involve referring to Earth; and it is
not usually thought to be easy to refer to objects towards which one
bears no spatiotemporal or causal relations.16 When I say that some
swans on Earth are blue, Twin surely does not: rather, he says that
some swans on Earth-Prime are blue, where Earth-Prime is the planet
Twin lives on. Similarly, when I say that some swans in Cosmo are
blue, Twin under analogous circumstances says, instead, that some
swans in Cosmo-Prime are blue.
One important motivation for wanting to resist (9) is the doctrine,
defended by Lewis (OPW 1.4), that propositions—at least in one cen-
tral sense—can be identified with sets of Lewis-worlds. Anyone who
accepts this will presumably think that there is a proposition, call it
P, which is—or at least, can for present purposes be identified with—
the set of Lewis-worlds that contain blue swans. P will be a natural
candidates to be the proposition that somer swans are blue. But if we
sometimes express P by saying ‘some swans are blue’, surely people
in other Lewis-worlds can do so with equal ease. There is nothing in
the nature of P that could, given any sensible theory of what it takes
16Perhaps there are some contexts in which reference is very easily achieved—
maybe it is even true in some of these contexts that whenever one says that all Fs are
Gs, and x is an F, one says that x is G. By these lax standards, Twin can easily say
that some swans on Earth are blue, just by saying that some swans on every planet
(unrestrictedly speaking) are blue. But it is implausible that all contexts work like
this; we can run our argument within a less permissive context. And even by very
permissive standards, it is still not plausible that Twin says that some swans on Earth
are blue when he utters the sentence ‘some swans on Earth are blue’.
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to express a set of worlds, make it easier to express here in Cosmo
than anywhere else.
In fact, those (like Lewis) who identify all propositions with sets of
Lewis-worlds are under pressure to reject claims like (9) even if they
do identify contingency-inducing quantification with de re restricted
quantification! For if the proposition that no swans on Earth are blue
is a set of Lewis-worlds, which set is it? If we help ourselves to a
counterpart relation, there are a few natural candidates: the set of
Lewis-worlds in which some counterpart of Earth lacks blue swans;
the set of Lewis-worlds in which every counterpart of Earth lacks
blue swans; the set of Lewis-worlds in which there is exactly one
counterpart of Earth, which lacks blue swans. Whichever we choose,
we will be committed to the claim that whenever the counterparts
of x are exactly the counterparts of Earth, the proposition that there
are no blue swans on x is identical to the proposition that there are
no blue swans on Earth. So if Earth-Prime and Earth happen to be
similar enough to share exactly the same counterparts, people on
Earth-Prime who utter the words ‘some swans on Earth are blue’ do
thereby say that there some swans on Earth are blue!17 I think this is
a reductio of the doctrine that all propositions can be identified with
sets of Lewis-worlds. Let me reiterate the arguments I have given.
First, since no swans on Earth are blue, anyone who says that some
swans on Earth are blue says something false, but people on Earth-
Prime who utter the words ‘some swans on Earth are blue’ do not
thereby say anything false. Second, saying that some swans on Earth
are blue requires referring to Earth, which normally requires being
spatiotemporally or causally related to Earth.18 However, someone
17Similarly, if Cosmo-Prime and Cosmo have exactly the same counterparts—if,
for example, each has all and only Lewis-worlds as counterparts, as entertained
above—then the proposition that there are no blue swans in Cosmo-Prime is the
proposition that there are no blue swans in Cosmo, and anyone who asserts one
asserts both.
18This reductio thus reinforces the following argument against the general iden-
tification of propositions with sets of Lewis-worlds, which was developed in Dorr
2005: Consider a Lewis-world w that contains two counterparts of Earth, only one
inhabited by blue swans. If the proposition that there are blue swans on Earth is
a set of Lewis-worlds, it either does or doesn’t contain w. In either case, we are in
danger of having to accept something obviously false, assuming ascriptions of truth
might agree with me about this while maintaining that nevertheless
there are some propositions which can be identified with sets of Lewis-
worlds, and are eligible for being expressed by utterances of simple
quantified sentences.
So much for why someone might be motivated to resist the argu-
ment for (9); what might they say against it? The response will surely
involve insisting that, whatever about (8), we can certainly accept (8′):
(8′) When people in Cosmo-Prime say ‘some swans are blue’,
they don’t often say anything false at Cosmo-Prime.
But how is this supposed to help rebut the argument for (9)? I see two
possible strategies, which I will call the contextualist strategy and the
relativist strategy.
According to the contextualist strategy, sentences involving the un-
adorned ‘true’ are, in general, devices for making claims which can
be explicitly spelled out using ‘true at’. In particular, someone who
sincerely and literally utters (8) will thereby claim, of some specific
Lewis-world w, that when people in Cosmo-Prime say ‘some swans
are blue’, they don’t often say anything that is false at w. In general,
the relevant Lewis-world will be the one the speaker is part of. But
in the case of a sentence like (8), which mention other Lewis-worlds,
this presumption can be overcome; thus (8) is naturally used to ex-
press what (8′) expresses. Thus (7) and (8) are both true if we resolve
their context sensitivity in the most natural way, but in that case the
argument to (9) is invalid.
This story is hard to square with the evident equivalence, across
all contexts, of φ and pthe proposition that φ is trueq. Given this
equivalence, ‘true’ as applied to propositions cannot introduce any
new context-sensitivity: if truth-ascriptions have a hidden contextual
to propositions in modal contexts work in the obvious way. If the proposition does
contain w, the worry is that ‘The proposition that there are blue swans on Earth is
such that possibly, it is true even though there are no blue swans on Earth’ will come
out true. If it doesn’t, the worry is that ‘The proposition that there are blue swans on
Earth is such that possibly, it isn’t true even though there are blue swans on Earth’
will come out true. Dorr 2005 concludes that we cannot escape this dilemma by
adopting some non-obvious analysis of ascriptions of truth to propositions in modal
contexts.
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parameter whose value is a Lewis-world, then every sentence has a
hidden contextual parameter whose value is a Lewis-world. There
is just no question whether there are blue swans on Earth simpliciter,
only whether there are blue swans on Earth relative to this or that
Lewis-world. But this just takes us back to the “modal B-theory”
discussed and set aside at the beginning of the present section.
According to the relativist strategy, on the other hand, we admit that
there is such a thing as just claiming a proposition to be true or false,
as opposed to claiming it to be true or false at a given world. When
truth and falsity is understood in this way, the T-schema is valid; thus
(7) is acceptable. So given that we want to accept (6) while rejecting
(9), we are indeed forced to reject (8). People in Cosmo-Prime do say
(and mean, and believe) that somer swans are blue, and what they
say is false, since nor swans are blue. Nevertheless, (8′) is true: what
they say is not false at Cosmo-Prime. At Cosmo-Prime, it is they who
are right and we who are wrong. This further claim is supposed to
help us overcome our initial inclination to endorse (8).
Views that deploy the ideology of “relative truth” in this way have
recently been quite popular in many domains: defenders include Mac-
Farlane (2005, 2007), Lasersohn (2005), Richard (2008), Kölbel (2002),
and many others. Another example should convey the general pat-
tern. A Relativist about ‘tasty’ who, unlike me, dislikes Marmite will
think (i) that Marmite is tasty for me and not tasty for him; (ii) that
the proposition that Marmite is tasty is true for me and false for him;
(iii) that Marmite is not tasty, and the proposition that Marmite is
tasty is false; (iv) that I believe the false proposition that Marmite is
tasty, and assert it when I say ‘Marmite is tasty’; but (v) my believ-
ing and asserting this false proposition involves “no fault”, in some
strong sense that goes beyond the idea that I am fully justified in my
belief.19 The view about contingency-inducing quantification that we
are considering works in a similar way. People in other Lewis-worlds
who are looking at blue swans will frequently come to believe and
assert the false proposition that somer swans are blue. However,
since this proposition is true for them, in believing and asserting it
they are conducting themselves “correctly”; their having these false
19See Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009, chapter 1.
beliefs involves “no fault”; they are achieving the “goals” of belief
and assertion; etc.
Even for words like ‘tasty’, the Relativist programme strikes me as
extremely problematic. According to the Relativist, I ought to think
that the things that are tasty for me are tasty, and the propositions
that are true for me are true, whereas the propositions that are true for
other people are often false; if they believe these propositions, as they
ought, they will getting things wrong. This seems to describe a state
of extraordinary intellectual hubris: why should I be so confident that
I am the special person truth for whom coincides with truth? The
further claim that everyone else ought to regard themselves as special
in the same way doesn’t do anything to dispel the implausibility of
this.
I will admit, though, that Relativism for ‘tasty’ has some prima
facie appeal. It is certainly tempting to think that if you don’t like
Marmite, you disagree with me about whether Marmite is tasty, and
thus believe, falsely, that it isn’t tasty. By reflecting on the difficulty of
convincing you of this, I could easily end up thinking that there is no
good reasoning that could convince you that Marmite is not tasty, and
indeed, that good reasoning requires you to stick as firmly to your
false belief as it requires me to stick to my true one. I can imagine
getting this far and still feeling that in some sense our disagreement
is not deep—and obscure as it is, the “no fault” idea perhaps does
something to articulate this elusive notion of shallowness.
By contrast, when the difference between the relevant others and
me is just that we are in different Lewis-worlds, there is nothing even
prima facie appealing about Relativism. Why should I think, just on
the grounds that Twin is not spatiotemporally related to me, that
he will form lots of false beliefs, for example the belief that somer
swans are blue, if he reasons as he should? The claim that Twin and I
are committed to disagreeing about some proposition (viz. that somer
swans are blue), just because I think there are no swans in my Lewis-
world are blue while Twin thinks that some swans in his Lewis-world
are blue, is no more plausible than the claim that if you and I are
committed to disagreeing about some proposition just because I think
that there is beer in my house and you think that there is no beer in
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yours. One would only be tempted to think that Twin disagrees with
me if one confused this claim with some counterfactual claim to the
effect that if things had been thus and so, I would have disagreed
with the views I actually hold. But this would be a bad confusion:
it would be like inferring the false conclusion that there is a city that
Twin hates and I like from the (perhaps true) premise that there is a
city I actually like but would have hated if I had instantiated Twin’s
qualitative profile.20
The case for (9) stands: when people in other Lewis-worlds use
contingency-inducing quantifiers, they generally do not say the same
things we say when we use contingency-inducing quantifiers. This
is straightforwardly explained by the hypothesis that contingency-
inducing quantification is de re restricted quantification. I grant
that other explanations are conceivable. One could, for instance,
propose that vim comes in a multitude of different flavours: our
contingency-inducing quantifiers are restricted to things with our
flavour of vim, while Twin’s contingency-inducting quantifiers are
restricted to things with his different flavour of vim. But what is the
point? Given the strength of the independent reasons for regarding
de re restricted quantification as pervasive, the postulation of a myste-
rious new realm of properties that are neither qualitative nor de re just
in order to provide an additional source of contingency in quantified
claims is utterly ill-motivated.
6 Counterpart theory: the singly de re
When φ is a closed sentence containing no de re elements at all, either
overt or covert, the modal realist should claim that for it to be possible
or necessary that φ is just for it to be the case that φ. What if φ does
contain referential singular terms (including free variables)? Let us
begin by considering how the analysis should work when there just
20Ironically, one of MacFarlane’s favourite ways of defending Relativism in other
domains is to appeal to something very like the view I have just been criticising:
‘Consider Jane (who inhabits this world, the actual world) and June, her counterpart
in another possible world. Jane asserts that Mars has two moons, and June denies
this very proposition. Do they disagree? Not in any real way.’ (MacFarlane 2007:
p. 10)
one such term has occurrences in φ.
Lewis 1968 is a good place to start. Although that paper deals in
translations between formal languages rather than analyses stated in
English, there is an obvious way to read off from the translation a




∃w∃v(w is a Lewis-world ∧ v is in w ∧ v C t ∧ φw(v)).
Necessarily φ(t)↔df
∀w∀v((w is a Lewis-world ∧ v is in w ∧ v C t)→ φw(v)).
Here ‘φ(t)’ is to be replaced with a sentence in which t is the only free
variable or directly referential term and everything else is qualitative;
φ(v) is the result of replacing all occurrences of t in φ(t) with some
variable v which does not already occur in φ(t); and φw(v) is the result
of adding a restriction to things in w to every quantifier in φ(v) that
isn’t in the scope of any modal operator in ψ. ‘v C t’ abbreviates ‘v is
a counterpart of t’.
Since Lewis only deals with a simple formal language, it isn’t en-
tirely clear how we should define quantifier-restricting operation ‘w’
so as to apply to a larger range of English sentences. But there is no
point in puzzling further about this: in the light of our conclusion
that contingency-inducing quantification is de re restricted quantifi-
cation, we should just drop the quantifier-restricting machinery from
the analysis altogether. Since t is the only non-qualitative constituent
of the formula φ(t), any syntactically simple quantifiers in φ(t) must
be unrestricted, or restricted only qualitatively; in either case, they are
modally constant. If the role of t in φ(t) is to restrict some quantifiers,
then v will automatically play the same role in φ(v); there is no need
for us to put in any new restrictions by hand.
Once we eliminate ‘w’ from Analysis A, the only remaining role
played by the quantifier over Lewis-worlds is that of restricting the
values of v to objects that are in some Lewis-world. But this is need-
lessly complex: if we wanted this effect, we could get it just by building
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it into the analysis of ‘counterpart’ that only things that are parts of
Lewis-worlds can be counterparts of anything. Thus Analysis A can
be reduced to the simpler Analysis B:
Possibly φ(t)↔df ∃v(v C t ∧ φ(v))Analysis B
Necessarily φ(t)↔df ∀v(v C t→ φ(v))
Now we can take φ(t) to be any English sentence, provided that it
contains no non-qualitative expressions apart from t.21
While we could say that only things that are in Lewis-worlds are
counterparts of other things, we shouldn’t do so if we want to respect
obviously valid inferences involving modal operators. One such in-
ference rule corresponds to the axiom T: pPossibly φq follows from φ.
Consider some object Frank which overlaps several Lewis-worlds. By
T, it is possible that Frank overlaps several Lewis-worlds. Since ‘over-
laps several Lewis-worlds’ is a qualitative predicate, this possibility
claim is singly de re. So according to Analysis B, it is equivalent to the
claim that some counterpart of Frank overlaps several Lewis-worlds.
If we thought that only parts of Lewis-worlds could be counterparts,
we would have to maintain, absurdly, that Frank overlaps several
Lewis-worlds despite the fact that it is not possible for it to do so.
We are still free to maintain, if we wish, that only parts of Lewis-
worlds are counterparts of other parts of Lewis-worlds. But even this
21We can even allow φ(t) to contain propositional attitude ascriptions: if we take
the name ‘Hesperus’ to be a referential term and hence an admissible substituend
for ‘t’, ‘Possibly someone believes that Hesperus is bright ↔df ∃x(x C Hesperus ∧
someone believes that x is bright)’ is a legitimate instance of Analysis B. Note that
this is logically equivalent to the analysis of ‘Possibly ∃y(y = Hesperus and someone
believes that y is bright)’. Some theories about the behaviour of names in attitude as-
criptions deny that ‘Someone believes that Hesperus is bright’ is logically equivalent
to ‘∃y(y = Hesperus and someone believes that y is bright)’; I count proponents of
these theories as denying that ‘Hesperus’ is a referential singular term, in the sense
relevant to what counts as a substitution instance of Analysis B. Most of these propo-
nents will also deny that ‘Hesperus’ is purely qualitative; in that case, they will not
be able to use Analysis B as an analysis of possibility claims involving ‘Hesperus’.
Nevertheless, they might endorse it as an analysis of possibility and necessity claims
in which ‘Hesperus’ occurs only outside the scope of attitude verbs, while leaving
the task of analysing modal sentences that embed attitude ascriptions for another
occasion.
seems unduly restrictive. Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) and Bricker
(2001) consider Lewis-worlds which consist of two large lobes of
spacetime, connected by a narrow and temporary wormhole. It seems
perfectly consistent to suppose that if things had been a little different
at earlier times, the wormhole wouldn’t have formed at all, so that the
thing that is in fact a Lewis-world would have been a fusion of two
Lewis-worlds. Similarly, it seems consistent to suppose that there was
a non-zero objective chance that the wormhole would never form, and
that the Lewis-world would be a fusion of two Lewis-worlds. Each
of these claims entails that the Lewis-world could have been a fusion
of two Lewis-worlds; given Analysis B, this means that it must have
a counterpart that is a fusion of two Lewis-worlds.22
What is it for one thing to be a counterpart of another? Lewis (1968)
connects the notion with that of resemblance: ‘Your counterparts re-
semble you closely in content and context in important respects. They
resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds.’ In
advising would-be modal realists to endorse Analysis B, I don’t mean
to tie ‘counterpart’ to any such gloss. ‘Possibly’ and ‘necessarily’,
and their close relatives ‘can’ and ‘must’, are notoriously context-
sensitive, with an range of meanings including philosophically in-
22Bigelow and Pargetter and Bricker use these cases to argue that it is possible for
there to be “island universes”—objects that stand in no spatiotemporal, or analogi-
cally spatiotemporal, relations to one another. They take it to be a serious problem
for Lewis’s view that he cannot accept this possibility, and Lewis agrees Lewis (1992:
p. 213–4). But since it is part of Lewis’s view that there are island universes, unre-
strictedly speaking, unless he rejects T he should accept that it is possible for there
to be island universes, unrestrictedly speaking. If Lewis takes my advice, the only
readings of ‘there could not be island universes’ which he should even consider
accepting are those on which it is equivalent to something like ‘there could not be
island universes within Cosmo’. And as we have seen, there is no special reason to
say this.
Bricker (2001) objects to certain strategies for interpreting utterances of ‘island
universes universes’ as contingently false on the grounds that they entail that ‘my
utterance is both contingently possible and analytically false. Not a happy combina-
tion.’ But if we take the utterance to mean ‘island universes are parts of Cosmo’, and
take the name ‘Cosmo’ to have been introduced by the description ‘the Lewis-world
of which we are parts’, then our knowledge that there are no island universes is just
an instance of the familiar Kripkean phenomenon of contingent a priori knowledge
associated with reference-fixing descriptions, which we should account for however
we generally account for such things. (See Dorr MS for one approach.)
12
teresting notions such as metaphysical, nomological, historical and
deontic modalities, as well as an open-ended range of further mean-
ings too idiosyncratic to have any special names. The thesis that all
contingency is de re contingency applies no matter which modality
we have in mind; Analysis B has to serve duty as an analysis of all
the kinds of modality.23 To achieve this, we will have to allow ‘coun-
terpart’ to inherit all the context-sensitivity of ‘can’ and ‘must’. For
each reading of modal operators that we dignify with a special name,
there will be a corresponding reading of ‘counterpart’; so we will have
nomological counterparthood, deontic counterparthood, metaphysi-
cal counterparthood, etc.24 For readings of ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’
that carry hidden indices, such as historical possibility as of a time or
doxastic possibility for a subject at a time, there will be corresponding
readings of ‘counterparthood’ that carry corresponding extra argu-
ment places, such as ‘x is a historical counterpart of y as of t’, or ‘x is a
doxastic counterpart of y for a at t’. Given this profusion of readings,
the task of analysing the particular counterpart relation appropriate
to a given context will have to involve a detailed consideration of the
way we use modal vocabulary in that context. It would be surprising
if there were useful generalisations relating all legitimate counterpart
relations to our intuitive notion of resemblance. Section 13 below will
consider the special case of modal talk in “metaphysical” contexts.
23Perhaps we should make an exception for epistemic modalities, which pose
many distinctive challenges.
24The fully general translation-scheme given in Lewis 1968 also builds in a special
role for an accessibility relation among Lewis-worlds, which is meant to allow us to
model different varieties of modality without varying the interpretation of ‘counter-
part’. Given that ‘counterpart’ is plausibly going to turn out to be context-sensitive
anyway (OPW §4.5), I don’t see that there is any advantage to be gained by having
two different moving parts in the analysis rather than one. So long as the objects we
are concerned with are worldbound, we can always subsume Lewis’s accessibility
relations into the counterpart relation, by adding an extra conjunct to our analysis
of ‘y is a counterpart of x’ requiring that if x and y are worldbound objects, y’s
Lewis-world be accessible from x’s.
7 Necessary existence
Since every counterpart of everything is identical to something (unre-
strictedly speaking), Analysis B entails that everything is necessarily
identical to something (unrestrictedly speaking):
(NE) ∀x∃y(y = x).
It has generally been found implausible that NE should be true in
every context; this is one of the standard objections to counterpart
theory.
One could avoid this without completely giving up on the spirit
of counterpart theory. For example, one could have a special object
such that having it among one’s counterparts makes it true that one
could have failed to exist: this would involve some further tinkering
with the formula φ(v) on the right hand side of Analysis B to make it
satisfiable (by the special object) even if φ(t) was ‘¬∃y(y = t)’.25 But so
long as we hold on to the aspiration to analyse every modal formula
in English using a nonmodal formula of English, and the assumption
that analyses licence substitution in modal contexts, there are serious
limitations to what can be achieved by such trickery. The problem is
that nonexistence seems to require having a very boring nonmodal
profile. For each object x, it is necessary that if nothing is identical
to x, then: x is not a person; x is not conscious; x is not positively
charged; and so on. Whatever the analysis of ‘possibly a philosopher’
in nonmodal terms looks like, either it or its negation will be entailed
by this boring nonmodal profile. In the latter case, we will have to say
that if I hadn’t existed, it wouldn’t have been possible for me to be a
philosopher; in the former case, we will have to say that if my pencil
hadn’t existed, it would have been possible for it to be a philosopher.
Neither of these claims fits well with the way we want to talk about
possible nonexistence in ordinary contexts.
Perhaps there is no point in starting down this path. When unre-
stricted quantification is in play, modal realists are used to disagreeing
with ordinary opinion. Nothing is more familiar to the modal realist
25Cf. Lewis’s (OPW 233) strategy for avoiding NE by allowing the extension of
the counterpart relation to include “gappy” sequences.
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than claiming, of some intuitively true sentence involving quantifiers,
that it is true only when the quantifiers are taken to be restricted. I
have argued that this is bound to happen with sentences like ‘It is con-
tingent whether some swans are blue’. Against the backdrop of this
pattern of agreement and disagreement with common sense, would
it really be bad for the modal realist to claim, analogously, that ‘It is
contingent whether something is identical with me’ is false when its
quantifier is taken unrestrictedly, so long as they go on to point out
that it can be made true by interpreting the quantifier as restricted?
The restriction could be to things on Earth, for example. While
have not yet considered how to analyse multiply de re sentences like
‘Possibly, nothing on Earth is identical to me’, there is no reason to
worry that they are false. Or the restriction could be to things in
Cosmo: however we end up accounting for the truth of ‘Possibly,
nothing on Earth is identical to me’, we should be able to account in
a parallel way for the truth of ‘Possibly, nothing in Cosmo is identical
to me.’
The claim that I could have failed to be in Cosmo is lousy as a
paraphrase of the commonsense thought that I could have failed to
exist. This thought is surely inconsistent with the claim that I could
not have failed to be a flesh-and-blood living being; whereas this claim
is perfectly consistent with the claim that I could have failed to be part
of Cosmo. I think it is quite plausible that the ‘exists’ in such contexts
expresses the property of being identical to something, unrestrictedly
speaking. The point I am making is just that once we have departed
from common sense to the extent of accepting claims of the form
‘If something is F, then necessarily something is F, unrestrictedly
speaking’ when F is qualitative, we should not be much perturbed if
we also decide to accept the instances where F is of the form ‘identical
to x’.
Having been deeply unpopular for decades, NE has recently
been vigorously defended by Zalta and Linsky (1994) and Timothy
Williamson (1998, 2002, MS). Part of Williamson’s defence involves
the claim that ordinary concrete objects could fail to be concrete.
According to Williamson, commonsense claims about the possible
nonexistence of concrete objects are often true if ‘exists’ in them is
replaced with ‘is concrete’. So for example, Caesar could have been
non-concrete, and would have been non-concrete if his parents had
never met, and Caesar’s death could not have been concrete unless
Caesar was. The modal realist is free to incorporate this idea, by
claiming that concrete objects can have non-concrete counterparts.
This allows for a more extensive area of agreement with ordinary
opinion. As part and parcel of holding that I could have failed to be
identical to anything at all, common sense holds that I could have
failed to have a mass, to be located in space, to be made of flesh and
blood, to be a person, to have parents, etc. Intuitively, I would have
failed to do any of these things if my parents had never met, as could
easily have happened. Modal realists can agree with this by allowing
that some of my counterparts don’t have a mass, are not located in
space, etc. If they don’t allow this, then—assuming that they follow
Lewis in holding that what is necessarily the case would have been the
case under any counterfactual supposition—they will have to say that
if my parents had never met, I would still have been a flesh-and-blood
person, with different parents, perhaps living on a different planet or
in a different Lewis-world. This seems needlessly absurd. 26
8 Counterpart theory: the multiply de re
Let us now turn to the general case, where modal operators are applied
to formulae that may contain more than one variable or referential
term. We can again take the 1968 theory as our starting point, reading
an analysis-schema off its translations in the obvious way:
Analysis C Possibly φ(t1, . . . , tn) ↔df there is a Lewis-world w
26However, some of our ordinary opinions about possible non-concreteness, like
our ordinary opinions about possible non-existence, are hard to square with any
reductive analysis of modality. Common sense seems to require non-concrete objects
to have rich and interesting modal profiles. If neither your parents nor mine had ever
met, neither of us would have been concrete; intuitively, under these circumstances, I
could fairly easily have been a concrete child of my actual parents, whereas it would
have been impossible, or at least much more difficult, for you to be a concrete child
of my actual parents. It is not obvious what nonmodal properties of non-concrete
objects, and nonmodal relations between them and concrete objects, could plausibly
be invoked to explain these differences in their modal properties.
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and objects v1. . . vn all in w, such that v1 C t1 ∧ · · · ∧ vn C tn ∧
φw(v1, . . . , vn).
Necessarily φ(t1, . . . , tn) ↔df for any Lewis-world w, and
any objects v1. . . vn all in w such that v1 C t1 ∧ · · · ∧ vn C tn,
φw(v1, . . . , vn).
‘φ(t1, . . . , tn)’ stands for any formula in which the syntactically sim-
ple referring terms (including variables) are t1 . . . tn, in order of first
occurrence, and without repetition, and in which all other vocabu-
lary is qualitative; ‘φ(v1, . . . , vn)’ is the result of uniformly substituting
for these terms variables v1. . . vn which do not already appear in
φ(t1, . . . , tn).
In the light of the thesis that contingency-inducing quantification
is de re restricted quantification, we will want to drop the quantifier-
restricting operation ‘w’ from this analysis. But the quantification
over Lewis-worlds in Analysis C isn’t just supplying a restrictor for
the quantifiers; it is also imposing some measure of co-ordination on
the sequences v1, . . . , vn that can witness the truth of a possibility-
claim. Suppose we just used Analysis D, which stands to Analysis C
as Analysis B stands to Analysis A.
Possibly φ(t1, . . . , tn)↔df
Analysis D
∃v1 . . .∃vn(v1 C t1 ∧ · · · ∧ vn C tn ∧ φ(v1, . . . , vn))
Necessarily φ(t1, . . . , tn)↔df
∀v1 . . .∀vn((v1 C t1 ∧ · · · ∧ vn C tn)→ φ(v1, . . . , vn))
This would saddle us with some unwelcome results. Consider a
painted wooden statue, Athena. I take it that some paint is part of
Athena, as opposed to merely being contiguous with Athena: one
does not need to deduct the weight of the paint from the reading on
the scale when one is asked to determine the weight of Athena, for
example. But there is an object that is made entirely of wood and
overlaps all the wood in Athena throughout her life. Perhaps there
are several such objects: focus on one, Athena-Minus, that is as statue-
like as possible, e.g. in that it comes into existence when the wood is
carved into a statue-shape. Then (10) seems like it should be true in
many ordinary contexts:
(10) It is not possible for Athena and Athena-Minus to be disjoint.
According to Analysis D, (10) is false if any counterpart of Athena
is disjoint from any counterpart of Athena-Minus: a condition that
is almost certainly satisfied in any context. Analysis C, by contrast,
makes it easier for (10) to be true: for it to be false, some counterpart of
Athena would have to be disjoint from some counterpart of Athena-
Minus in the same Lewis-world.
However—as Hazen (1979) argued, and as Lewis came to agree—
this still makes it too hard for claims like (10) to be true.27 For ac-
cording to Lewis, it is quite common for objects to have multiple
counterparts in the same Lewis-world. There are various consid-
erations which support this. One especially weighty one involves
qualitatively symmetric Lewis-worlds—e.g. worlds of two-way eter-
nal recurrence—which are strongly isolated (no part of them bears any
perfectly natural relation to anything outside them). Consider some
such Lewis-world w. For any qualitative relation R, and object x not
in w, if x bears R to any part y of w, x also bears R to all the other qual-
itative duplicates of y in w. But counterparthood, in many ordinary
contexts, including some where (10) is true, is a qualitative relation.28
So if an object has any counterpart in a strongly isolated, symmetric
Lewis-world other than its own, it has many. But a context in which
no object in a symmetric, strongly isolated Lewis-world counted as
a counterpart of any object in any other Lewis-world would be quite
bizarre. Suppose that you live in a symmetric and strongly isolated
Lewis-world: surely you could still have lived in such a world even
if you (along with all your images under the symmetry) had raised
27The entities in Hazen’s example are Caesar and his death; Lewis uses a pair of
twins.
28It wouldn’t really matter to this argument if we considered non-qualitative
counterpart relations: for all of the objects which might plausibly figure as de re
elements of the analysis of possibility claims made by us are spatiotemporally related
to us, and thus qualitative relations between them, us, and objects in other, symmetric,
strongly isolated Lewis-worlds are still invariant under the symmetries of those
Lewis-worlds.
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your right hand just now, while things remained the same in other
respects. But for this to be true, you may have to have counterparts
in other symmetric, strongly isolated Lewis-worlds: there may not be
anyone in this Lewis-world who is like you except for a raised right
hand.29
The trouble for Analysis C is deeper than this. The sentences that
require draconian and implausible constraints on the counterpart re-
lation to make true include not just intuitive claims like (10), but
sentences that express obviously valid principles of modal logic. Con-
sider for example the following modal schemas:
(S1) ^Fa→ ^(Fa ∨ Fb)
(S2) (Fa ∧ Fb)→ Fa
These seem as manifestly valid as anything could in the realm of
modal logic: they are especially trivial instances of the closure of
possibility and necessity under logical consequence, as ensured in
standard modal logic by the rule of necessitation and axiom K. But
look at the analysis of S1 given by Analysis C:
If some Lewis-world contains a counterpart of a that is F,
then some Lewis-world contains both a counterpart of a and
a counterpart of b, such that either the former or the latter is
F.
This is false if a has counterparts that are F, but all of them are in
Lewis-worlds that contain no counterparts of b. Thus, given Anal-
ysis C, guaranteeing the truth of all instances of S1 would require
29Biting the bullet here might be less implausible for someone who thought of
counterparthood in general as involving some external relation of the sort that cannot
hold between strongly isolated objects. On such a view, it is much harder for ordinary
possibility claims to be true: for an object to be possibly F, there needs to be a chain
of perfectly natural relations connecting it to something that is F. Lewis’s doctrine
of Humean Supervenience, however, commits him to thinking that ordinary modal
judgments are consistent with the hypothesis that the only perfectly natural relations
instantiated in our Lewis-world are spatiotemporal in character; this hypothesis
entails that our Lewis-world is strongly isolated.
claiming that every object has at least one counterpart in every Lewis-
world. (The same is easily seen to be true for S2.) But such a re-
quirement would generate wildly implausible assignments of truth
values to other sentences. For example, consider a tiny Lewis-world
w with no proper parts: w is in w, but nothing else is. The require-
ment would force w to be a counterpart of absolutely everything;
and that would make it true that everything could have been a spa-
tiotemporally isolated mereological atom. While this may be true in
some exotic contexts, it is surely not true across all legitimate contexts,
unlike S1.
In the 1983 postscripts to Lewis 1968 and in OPW, Lewis proposed
an elegant solution to some of the problems with Analysis C. Ac-
cording to this proposal, the analysis of multiply de re modal claims
involves a relation of counterparthood holding between sequences.30
Here is a statement of this analysis, incorporating the insight that there
is no need to include any special-purpose machinery for restricting
quantifiers:
Possibly φ(t1, . . . , tn)↔df
Analysis E
∃v1 . . .∃vn(〈v1, . . . , vn〉C〈t1, . . . , tn〉 ∧ φ(v1, . . . , vn))
Necessarily φ(t1, . . . , tn)↔df
∀v1 . . .∀vn(〈v1, . . . , vn〉C〈t1, . . . , tn〉 → φ(v1, . . . , vn))
Analysis E is strictly more general than Analysis C. If we wanted
to recover the effect of Analysis C in some context, we could do
so by analysing the counterpart relation on sequences in terms of a
counterpart relation on objects:
30In postscript D to the reprint of Lewis 1968, Lewis presents the “counterparts
of sequences” account not as a modification of the original 1968 translation from the
formal modal language to the language of counterpart theory, but as an alternative
to the obvious translation from English into the formal modal language. His idea
is that the English sentence ‘It is possible that Dee and Dum are unrelated’ should
be rendered formally as something like ‘∃z(z = 〈Dee,Dum〉) ∧ ^∃x∃y(z = 〈x, y〉 ∧
Unrelated(x, y))’. Given that the ultimate point is to come up with analyses that can
be stated in English, I take it nothing turns on this distinction.
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(11) 〈x1, . . . , xn〉C〈y1, . . . , yn〉 ↔df x1 C y1 and . . . and xn C yn and
x1 . . . xn are all in the same Lewis-world.
But we have already seen why we should not expect to be able to do
this (in ordinary contexts).31
Analysis E does not yield a reasonable modal logic all by itself:
to recover, for example, the inferences from ‘Possibly Fa and Gb’ to
‘Possibly Gb and Fa’ and ‘Possibly Fa’, we would need an axiom
ensuring that whenever 〈a, b〉 is a counterpart of 〈c, d〉, 〈b, a〉 is a coun-
terpart of 〈d, c〉 and 〈a〉 is a counterpart of 〈c〉.32 This suggests that
in taking ‘counterpart’ to apply to pairs of sequences, we are import-
ing superfluous structure: the work we are using pairs of sequences
〈〈a1, . . . , an〉, 〈b1, . . . , bn〉〉 to do could be done just as well by the sets
of ordered pairs {〈a1, b1〉, . . . , 〈an, bn〉}. The central role in an analy-
sis based on this insight will be done by a one-place predicate I will
pronounce ‘counterpairing’ and symbolise ‘C’. (Since ‘counterpart’ is
two-place, the use of the same symbol will not lead to ambiguities.)
For the sake of generality, instead of taking ‘C’ as applying to sets of
ordered pairs, I will take it as a plural predicate, applying to ordered
pairs taken collectively. It will be convenient to state the analysis in
the notation of second-order logic, using ‘Xx’ to abbreviate ‘x is one
31An alternative idea, due to Graeme Forbes (1985), is, roughly, to adopt Analysis E
while analysing 〈x1, . . . , xn〉C〈t1, . . . , tn〉 as ‘for some world w,∧i(either xi is in w and
xi C ti, or ti has no counterpart in w and xi = ti)’. This analysis has the advantage of
making S1 and S2 valid. However, it has implausible consequences as it stands, e.g.,
that if Gordon Brown is necessarily not a lonely electron, then for every x, necessarily,
if x is a lonely electron, then Gordon Brown is Prime Minister. Forbes’s remedy for
this involves a much more radical departure from Lewis’s project, in which atomic
predicates get endowed with extra argument places that in effect turn them into
relations to worlds.
32In general, whenever k1 . . . km is a sequence of distinct numbers ≤ n,
〈x1, . . . , xn〉C〈y1, . . . , yn〉 → 〈xk1 . . . xkm〉C〈yk1 . . . ykm〉.
of X’, and ‘Rxy’ to abbreviate ‘〈x, y〉 is one of R’:
Possibly φ(t1, . . . , tn)↔df
Analysis F
∃R∃v1 . . .∃vn(CR ∧ Rt1v1 ∧ . . . ∧ Rtnvn ∧ φ(v1, . . . , vn))
Necessarily φ(t1, . . . , tn)↔df
∀R∀v1 . . .∀vn((CR ∧ Rt1v1 ∧ . . . ∧ Rtnvn)→ φ(v1, . . . , vn))
We can recover Analysis E from Analysis F by analysing
‘〈x1, . . . , xn〉C〈y1, . . . , yn〉’ as ‘∃RCR ∧ Rx1y1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rxnyn’. And we
can recover Analysis B for singly de re sentences by analysing ‘x
is a counterpart of y’ (in the sense of Analysis B) as ‘〈x〉C〈y〉’, i.e.
‘∃R(CR ∧ Rxy)’.
Like Analysis E, Analysis F needs to be supplemented with further
axioms if we want to recover a reasonable modal logic, validating
inferences like S1 and S2. In both cases, we can recover as much
of orthodox modal logic as we want by imposing such axioms (see
section 9). From my point of view, Analysis F has one big advantage
over Analysis E, namely the fact that it can very easily be extended
to cover sentences in which plural terms and free variables occur in
the scope of modal operators. All we need to do is to define ‘RXY’
to abbreviate the following conjunction: (i) for any x that is one of X,
there is some y that is one of Y such that Rxy and (ii) for any y that
is one of Y, there is some x that is one of X such that Rxy. We can
then use Analysis F as it stands to analyse modal sentences involving
plural terms: we simply allow the terms t1, . . . , tn to be plural as well
as singular, understanding that the variables vi on the right-hand side
should be made plural or singular according as the original terms ti
were.
9 Constraints on counterpairings
Since modal operators are context-dependent, the answer to the ques-
tion what it is for some ordered pairs to be a counterpairing must vary
from one context to another. But it is plausible that certain schematic
principles involving modal operators are valid across all contexts;
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these will correspond to constraints which all legitimate senses of
‘counterpairing’ must meet.
The most central such principle is K:
(K) (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ).
This does not follow from Analysis F by itself. For example, ‘((Fa∧b =
b) → Fa) → ((Fa ∧ b = b) → Fa)’ is false if some counterpairings
map a to objects that are not F, but none of these counterpairings have
b in their domain. Given Analysis F, the most straightforward way
to guarantee the truth of every instance of (K) is to lay it down as
an axiom, true across all contexts, that counterpairings have universal
domains: whenever R is a counterpairing, ∀x∃yRxy. It is easy to see
that this validates (K).
We don’t, strictly speaking, need something quite this strong to
validate (K). It would be enough, for example, if we stipulated that
every counterpairing can be extended to a counterpairing with a universal
domain:
(12) CR→ ∃S(CS ∧ ∀x∀y(Rxy→ Sxy) ∧ ∀x∃ySxy).
But given (K) and Analysis F, we lose nothing by restricting our at-
tention to those counterpairings that do have universal domains: if
any counterpairing witnesses the truth of ‘possibly φ’, some counter-
pairing whose domain is universal does. The reasoning is simple. Let
U be all the things there are—the things such that everything is one of
them, and suppose that it is possible thatφ(t1, . . . , tn). By Analysis F, it
is (trivially) necessary that if φ(t1, . . . , tn) then φ(t1, . . . , tn) ∧ ∀x(Ux→
Ux). So by K, it is possible that φ(t1, . . . , tn) ∧ ∀x(Ux→ Ux). By Anal-
ysis F, this is true iff there is a counterpairing R that maps t1 . . . tm to
objects (singular or plural) v1 . . . vm such that φ(v1, . . . , vm), and also
maps U to some objects X such that ∀x(Xx → Xx). But any such
counterpairing has a universal domain. Thus, even if we started with
a sense of ‘counterpairing’ that applied to some relations that don’t
have universal domains, we will end up with equivalent analyses
if we redefine ‘counterpart’ so that it only applies to relations with
universal domains.
We can imagine other analyses of modal operators in terms of
counterpairings on which the existence of counterpairings with non-
universal domains makes a real difference: it would be no great tech-
nical feat to formulate an analysis-schema under which ‘I could have
failed to be identical to anything’ is equivalent to ‘there is a coun-
terpairing whose domain does not include me’. But as we saw in
section 7, there are formidable challenges facing reductionists about
modality who want to recover an intuitive account of the possibility of
nonexistence, under which, for example, I could have both failed to be
identical to anything and possibly been a philosopher. The strategy
of using counterpairings whose domain excludes x to encode possi-
bilities of x’s nonexistence, in particular, seems quite hard to develop
in a way that captures the range of predications that are intuitively
compatible with failure to exist. So I don’t think that in focusing on
Analysis F we are passing up any obviously superior alternatives.
Another characteristic feature of the standard theories in proposi-
tional modal logic is necessitation: if φ is a theorem, so is φ. If all
contingency is de re contingency, any theory whose axioms are purely
qualitative is guaranteed to have this feature. More generally, a theory
will be closed under necessitation whenever its theorems are indiffer-
ent to the identities of particular objects: if φ(t1, . . . , tn) is a theorem,
∀v1 . . .∀vnφ(v1, . . . , vn) is a theorem too.
Another axiom that is valid in all standard quantified modal logics
is Leibniz’s Law:
(LL) x = y→ (φ→ ψ)
where ψ is derived from φ by replacing one or more occurrences of
x with occurrences of y. An instance of LL is x = y → (x = x →
x = y). Since x = x is a theorem, this simplifies to the principle that
identity is necessary:
(NI) x = y→ x = y.
Given Analysis F, NI is equivalent to the claim that counterpairings are
functions: that is, whenever R is a counterparing and Rxy and Rxz,
y = z. A straightforward induction on the complexity of formulas
shows that this suffices for the full generality of LL, in the language
of quantified modal logic.
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Lewis was not a friend of the necessity of identity. There are two
main arguments against it in his work. The first appeals to the 1968
version of counterpart theory (our Analysis C): there, validating NI
would require denying that a single object ever has multiple counter-
parts in one Lewis-world, which is implausible (especially because of
qualitatively symmetric Lewis-worlds). This argument lapses once
Analysis C is replaced with Analysis E or Analysis F.
The second argument involves putative counterexamples like (13):
(13) The plastic is identical to the dishpan, but might not have
been.
According to Lewis, (13) can be used to say something true. But (13)
cannot be true in any context if NI holds in every context. I don’t
think we should be swayed by this argument either, even if we accept
the premise. We already know that sentences like (14) are not true in
any single context:
(14) The plastic is identical to the dishpan, but while the plastic
could have survived squashing, the dishpan could not.
If there is a way to say something true by uttering (14), it requires
“changing the context in mid-utterance”, i.e. resolving the context-
sensitivity of “could” in a non-uniform way. But all kinds of sentences,
even paradigmatic logical falsehoods like ‘Mary is ready and Mary is
not ready’, or ‘Bruce Wayne is identical to Batman and Bruce Wayne is
strong and Batman is not strong’, can be used to express truths when
we resolve their context-sensitivity nonuniformly. In general, when
one claims a schema, say ‘¬(φ ∧ ¬φ)’, to be “logically valid”, one is
committed only to its instances being true on all uniform resolutions of
their context-sensitivity. But the considerations that might motivate
someone to assert (13) are the same kinds of considerations that might
motivate someone to assert (14). If we anchor ourselves in a single
context, say by stipulating that by our current standards ‘the plastic
could have survived squashing’ is true, and hence ‘if the plastic is
identical to the dishpan, the dishpan could have survived squashing’
is true too, the temptation to assert (13) evaporates. Thus, it would not
be implausible to claim that (13) is like (14) in being false on all uniform
interpretations. Granted, since (13) only contains one occurrence of
a modal operator, it is not obvious how to generate a non-uniform
interpretation of (13) on which it is true. Perhaps, if we think that
(13) can be used to communicate a truth, we will have to regard it as
some kind of nonliteral discourse. But this seems better than trying
to find a single context within which (13) is literally true: the way we
are tempted to talk when we are tempted to utter sentences like (13)
cannot sensibly be accommodated within any one context.33
Thus, I am not persuaded by Lewis’s case against the validity of NI.
Nor do I see that Lewis has done anything to undermine the force of
the canonical (Kripkean) argument for NI. If x is necessarily identical
to x, and y is x, then y must also be necessarily identical to x! There
is no point in having a semantic debate about whether this counts as
an genuine instance of Leibniz’s Law. If one denies the validity of the
Kripkean argument while accepting the validity of ‘a is red; b = a; so b
is red’, one will of course want to find a meaning for ‘Leibniz’s Law’ on
which the latter argument is, and the former argument is not, among
its instances. It is not technically challenging for a counterpart theorist
to do this. But this terminological achievement does nothing at all to
undermine the impression that the argument is, in fact, obviously
valid. Endorsing a counterpart-theoretic analysis of modal claims
does not mean one has to throw away one’s prior intuitions about
the validity of arguments involving modal operators! Rather, as we
have seen, such intuitions are a crucial guide in determining what
it takes for the counterpart relation to hold, or for a relation to be a
counterpairing.34
33Sider (2009: p. 28) makes a similar point.
34One further point. There is no problem making sense of a sense of ‘counter-
pairing’ under which it applies to non-functions, or of sentences pschmossibly φq
stipulated to be analysed in terms of such a notion. But ‘schmossibly’, so under-
stood, is semantically anomalous, in that the stipulated meaning of pschmossibly
φq depends on merely orthographic features of φ. In general, we are free to intro-
duce new words by stipulating them to be semantically equivalent to old words,
and we expect the new words so introduced to be intersubstitutable salva veritate
with the old words they were stipulated to be equivalent to, with the exception
of quotation-like contexts. For example, I can stipulate that ‘Lavid Dewis’ is to
be semantically equivalent to the name ‘David Lewis’. If we hold on to Analy-
sis F as our analysis of pschmossibly φq, however, we find that ‘Schmossibly David
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Requiring counterpairings to be functions also validates a further
principle of plural modal logic which captures one half of the idea that
plurals are rigid: when a thing is one of some things, it is so necessarily.
(NO) Xx→ Xx.
If x is one of X, and there is only one object y such that Rxy, then it
follows from our definition of ‘RXY’ that y is one of Y whenever RXY.
The converse is true too: if any counterpairing relates some object to
two distinct objects, NO is not universally true.35 This is unsurpris-
ing, given that such counterpairings generate counterexamples to the
necessity of identity: if one thought, concerning Russell, that Russell
and he identical but could have failed to be, one would also naturally
think, concerning Russell and Whitehead, that Russell is one of them
but could have failed to be.
If one rejected the necessity of existence, one might be worried
about NO even if one had no doubts about the necessity of identity.
Lewis , David Lewis’ is analysed as ‘∃R∃x1(CR ∧ R(David Lewis, x1) ∧ x1 , x1)’,
which is false, whereas ‘Schmossibly Lavid Dewis , David Lewis’ is analysed as
‘∃R∃x1∃x2(CR ∧ R(David Lewis, x1) ∧ R(Lavid Dewis, x2) ∧ x1 , x2)’, which is true
if there is a counterpairing that includes two distinct ordered pairs having Lewis
as first element. So ‘schmossibly’ with those stipulated truth-conditions creates a
quotation-like context, in which even expressions that are stipulated to be semanti-
cally equivalent cannot be substituted salva veritate. Our ordinary word ‘possibly’, by
contrast, surely does not create a quotation-like context: the truth-value of ppossibly
φq is sensitive only to semantic features of φ.
While requiring counterpairings to be functions is one way to insure that the
resulting operator is not quotation-like, it is not the only way. We could also explore
an schema like Analysis F except that the list t1, . . . , tn is taken to stand for the possibly
repeating list of token singular terms in φ, in order of occurrence. On this analysis,
‘^(Ft ∧ ¬Ft)’ is equivalent to ‘∃R∃x1∃x2(CR ∧ Rtx1 ∧ Rtx2 ∧ Fx1 ∧ ¬Fx2)’, which can
be true if R is non-functional. More interestingly, we could, following Kit Fine’s
suggestion (2007), make the truth-conditions of pPossibly φq sensitive to semantic
relations between the terms in φ that do not depend on their semantic values. It may
be that whereas ‘Lavid Dewis’ bears the same semantic relations to ‘David Lewis’
that ‘David Lewis’ bears to itself, this is not generally true of pairs of coreferential
names, or of pairs of distinct variables.
35Take x to be an object which a counterpairing R maps to two distinct objects
y and z, X to be any objects that include X, and Y to be be all the objects to which
objects in X bear R, except for z. Then RXY: each of X bears R to one of Y, and each
of Y is borne R to by one of X. Since R is a counterpairing such that Rxz and RXY
and not Yz, it is not necessary that Xx.
Consider Russell and Whitehead again. Would Russell still have been
one of them if Whitehead had failed to be anything at all? Would
Russell still have been one of them if Russell had failed to be anything
at all? The answers are far from obvious. If we tried to tinker with
counterpart theory to allow for contingent existence, we would face
delicate and difficult questions about how our analysis should deal
with occurrences of ‘is one of’ in modal contexts. But if we follow the
advice of section 7 and don’t bother, I can’t think of any other reason
to worry about the consequence that NO and NI stand or fall together.
If we are going to require counterpairings to be universally defined
functions, we can simplify the formulation of our analysis by helping
ourselves to the standard functor notation: R(x) stands for the object
y such that Rxy, and likewise R(X) stands for the objects Y such that
RXY:
Possibly φ(t1, . . . , tn)↔df ∃R(CR ∧ φ(R(t1), . . . ,R(tn)))Analysis F*
Necessarily φ(t1, . . . , tn)↔df ∀R(CR→ φ(R(t1), . . . ,R(tn))
However, abbreviations like this create the potential for scope ambigu-
ity when dealing with iterated modalities. If we want Analysis F* to be
equivalent to Analysis F, we must be careful to treat the complex terms
R(ti) as having widest possible scope. We want ‘^^Fa’ to be equivalent
to ‘∃R(CR ∧ ∃S(CS ∧ FS(R(a))))’, not ‘∃R(CR ∧ ∃S(CS ∧ FS(R)(S(a))))’.
One rigorous way to achieve this would be to follow Russell in taking
sentences involving functors as abbreviations of quantified sentences
in a functor-free language, and stipulate that the Russellian transla-
tions are to be applied in such a way that the quantifier introduced by
each complex term takes the widest possible scope.
There are many other formal schemas which have been thought to
be logically valid for some or all readings of ‘necessarily’ and ‘possi-
bly’. Many of these correspond naturally to constraints on counter-
pairings. Several of these schemas, including those we have already
considered, are listed in Table 1, together with the constraints on coun-
terpairings that correspond to them. Some remarks on these results:
(i) The axioms listed stand in the following logical relations: (i)
T entails D; (ii) Given K and D, 5 and T are jointly equivalent
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Axiom Constraint
K (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ) Counterpairings have universal do-
mains: CR→ ∀x∃yRxy
D φ→ ^φ There is at least one counterpairing:
∃RCR
T φ→ φ The identity relation is a counterpairing:
∀x∀y(Rxy↔ x = y)→ CR
NI x = y→ x = y Counterpairings are functional:
(CR ∧ Rxy ∧ Rxz)→ y = zNO Xx→ Xx
ND x , y→ x , y Counterpairings are one-one:
(CR ∧ Rxz ∧ Ryz)→ x = yNNO ¬Xx→ ¬Xx
CBF ∀xφ→ ∀xφ
Automatic from Analysis F
CBF2 ∀Xφ→ ∀Xφ
BF ∀xφ→ ∀xφ Every counterpairing can be extended
so that any given object is in its range:
CR → ∀x∃S∃y(CS ∧ ∀z1∀z2(Rz1z2 →
Sz1z2) ∧ Syx)
BF2 ∀Xφ→ ∀Xφ Counterpairings have universal ranges:
CR→ ∀y∃xRxy
B φ→ ^φ R−1 (the converse of R) is a counterpair-
ing when R is:
(CR ∧ ∀x∀y(Sxy↔ Ryx))→ CS
4 φ→ φ R ◦ S (the relative product of R with S)
is a counterpairing when R and S are:
(CR ∧ CS ∧ ∀x∀y(Qxy ↔ ∃z(Sxz ∧
Rzy))→ CQ
5 ^φ→ ^φ R ◦ S−1 is a counterpairing when R and
S are:
(CR ∧ CS ∧ ∀x∀y(Qxy ↔ ∃z(Szx ∧
Rzy))→ CQ
Table 1. Some modal axioms, together with constraints on coun-
terpairings that generate them.
to 4 and B; (iii) Modulo K and B, 4 is equivalent to 5, ND
is equivalent to NI, NNO is equivalent to NO, and BF is
equivalent to CBF. The same pattern of logical relations holds
among the corresponding constraints on counterpairings.
(ii) Given Analysis F, BF2 entails BF, and the same entailment
holds between the corresponding constraints.
(iii) Given Analysis F, the constraints listed in the right-hand
column entail every instance of the corresponding axiom-
schemas in the left-hand column, with the proviso that for
4, B and 5, the entailments only hold on the assumption that
‘counterpairing’ is a qualitative predicate.36 In proving that
these entailments hold, we need to rely on the fact that our
definition of ‘RXY’ is well-behaved, in the following ways:
if R is functional (y = z whenever Rxy and Rxz), then it is
also “functional on plural arguments”: if RXY and RXZ,
then ∀x(Yx ↔ Zx); similarly for the property of being one-
to-one. If S is the converse of R (∀x∀y(Sxy ↔ Ryx), then
SXY iff RYX. And if Q is the relative product of R and S
(∀x∀y(Qxy↔ ∃z(Rxz∧Szy))), then QXY iff∃Z(RXZ∧SZY).37
36Our analysis allows non-qualitative senses of ‘counterpairing’, corresponding
to contexts where ‘possible’ means something like ‘historically possible as of 1900’
or ‘consistent with Clinton’s beliefs in 1995’. For these, something a bit more com-
plicated is needed to validate 4, B or 5. Take for instance a notion of ‘counterpairing’
that takes one extra singular argument. For 4 (‘xφ → xxφ’) to be valid for the
corresponding sense of necessity, we need it to be the case that whenever R is an
x-counterpairing, S is a y-counterpairing, and Rxy, S ◦ R is an x-counterpairing.
37I will prove the last of these lemmas, and show how to use it to establish the
entailment for S4. Right-to-left: suppose that RXZ and SZY. Then ∀x∈X ∃z∈Z(Rxz)
and ∀z∈Z ∃y∈Y(Szy), so ∀x∈X ∃y∈Y ∃z(Rxz ∧ Szy). So ∀x∈X ∃y∈Y(Qxy)), since
Q = S◦R. By analogous reasoning, ∀y∈Y∃x∈X(Qxy)); hence QXY. Left-to-right: Let Z
comprise all and only those objects z such that for some x and y, Xx∧Yy∧Rxz∧Szy.
If QXY, then ∀x∈X ∃y∈Y Qxy. So ∀x∈X ∃y∈Y ∃z(Rxz ∧ Szy))). By the definition of Z,
every such z is one of Z. So ∀x∈X ∃z∈Z(Rxz). And it follows from the definition of Z
that ∀z∈Z ∃x∈X(Rxz). Hence RXZ. Analogous reasoning shows that SZY.
We can now show that if R ◦ S is a counterpairing whenever R and S are, and
φ(t1, . . . , tn), then φ(t1, . . . , tn). By Analysis F, if φ(t1, . . . , tn), then φ(v1, . . . , vn)
whenever Q is a counterpairing and Qt1v1. . . and Qtnvn. By the constraint, it follows
that this is also true whenever Q = R ◦ S and R and S are counterpairings. By the
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(iv) With the exception of NI/NO, ND/NNO, and D, the modal
axiom-schemas do not actually entail the corresponding con-
straints. Rather, the relation is the one we have already saw
in the case of K: if we have a sense of ‘counterpairing’ un-
der which all instances of the axiom-schema are true (given
Analysis F), we can use it to define a new sense of ‘counter-
pairing’ which satisfies the corresponding constraint, with-
out thereby affecting the analysis of any modal sentence or
formula. In the case of K, BF and BF2, the new sense will
strengthen the old sense just enough to satisfy the constraint—
e.g. for BF2, to be a counterpairing in the new sense is to be
a counterpairing in the old sense whose range is universal.
In the case of T, B, 4 and 5, the new sense will weaken the old
sense just enough to satisfy the constraint—e.g. for 4, the new
sense is the closure of the old sense under composition.38 We
can prove that the analyses we get from Analysis F using the
new sense of ‘counterpairing’ will be logically equivalent to
analyses using the old sense of ‘counterpairing’.39
above lemma, Qtivi ↔ ∃u(Stiu ∧ Ruvi), whether ti, vi and u are singular or plural. So
φ(v1, . . . , vn) whenever R and S are counterpairings and ∃u1 . . .∃un St1u1 ∧ Ru1v1 ∧
· · · ∧ Stnun ∧ Runvn. (Here ui and vi are plural variables iff ti is a plural term.)
That is: whenever S is a counterpairing and St1u1 ∧ · · · ∧Stnun, then: whenever R is a
counterpairing and Ru1v1∧· · ·∧Runvn, then: φ(v1, . . . , vn). So by a double application
of Analysis F, φ(t1, . . . , tn).
38This closure can be defined with a little trickery using plural quantification over
ordered triples. Thus: R is a counterpairing in the extended sense ↔df there is a
number n and some ordered triples X such that (i) the first element of each of X is a
number less than n; (ii) whenever 0 ≤ i < n, the ordered pairs 〈x, y〉 such that 〈i, x, y〉
is one of X are a counterpairing in the old sense; (iii) any ordered pair 〈x, y〉 is one of R
iff for some function f , f (0) = x and f (n) = y and whenever 0 ≤ i < n, 〈i, f (i), f (i + 1)〉
is one of X.
39Here is the proof for B: the others are similar. Let C∗R be defined as CR ∨CR−1;
let ^∗ and ∗ be defined as in Analysis F but using C∗ instead of C. It is obvious
from the definition that for any formula φ, ^φ entails ^∗φ and ∗φ entails φ;
what we need to show is that the converse entailments also hold. For simplicity,
suppose φ contains just one singular term t and no plural terms. Assume ^∗φ(t):
that is, ∃R∃x((CR ∨ CR−1) ∧ Rtx ∧ φ(x)). If CR, then evidently ^φ(t); so suppose
CR−1 ∧ Rtx ∧ φ(x). Since B is valid for  and ^, it follows that ^φ(x): that is,
∀R1∀z1((CR1 ∧ R1 yz1)→ ∃R2∃z2(CR2 ∧ R2z1z2 ∧ φ(z2)))
10 “Possible worlds”
Lewis often writes in OPW as if the following schematic equivalences
were common ground between him and his opponents:
(15) a. Possibly φ iff φ at some possible world.
b. Necessarily φ iff φ at every possible world.
Lewis presents his analysis as the result of analysing ‘possible world’
in these schemas as ‘Lewis-world’, and analysing ‘at w, φ’ (also writ-
ten ‘φ according to w’ and ‘w represents that φ’) in terms of counter-
parts. I have argued that in fact, quantification over Lewis-worlds
per se plays no role in the best counterpart-theoretic analysis of modal
claims. And the claim is highly misleading even if we stick with the
counterpart theory of Lewis 1968: ‘at w’ would need to be spelled out
using existential quantification over counterparts in (15a) and using
universal quantification over counterparts in (15b).
This isn’t to say, however, that counterpart theory analysis can’t
be understood as a specification of (15). It can! For as we have seen,
provided that we require all counterpairings to be universally defined
functions, Analysis F is equivalent to Analysis F*. And Analysis F* is
of the right logical form to be a specification of (15a) and (15b): we
need only understand ‘possible world’ to mean ‘counterpairing’, and
adopt the following analysis of what it is for something to be the case
“at” a relation R:
(16) at Rφ(t1, . . . , tn)↔df φ(R(t1), . . . ,R(tn))
If to be a possible world is just to be something that plays the role
defined by (15), then Lewis-worlds are not possible worlds, but
counterpairings—provided that they are required to be universally
Putting R−1 for R1 and t for z1, we can deduce that
∃R2∃z2(CR2 ∧ R2tz2 ∧ φ(z2))
—that is, ^φ(t). Similar reasoning shows that φ(t) entails ∗φ(t). The extension
to sentences containing multiple variables is straightforward. For the extension to
plural variables, we also need the fact that if S = R−1 then SXY iff RYX; this follows
from the definition of SXY.
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defined functions—are. (But remember that strictly speaking there are
no such things as counterpairings, since quantification over counter-
pairings is officially cashed out as plural quantification over ordered
pairs.)
In fact, however, there is more to the role implicitly defined by the
way philosophers and semanticists talk about possible worlds than
(15). There are some other principles that seem almost as central. If
counterpairings are possible worlds, the following should surely be
true for each counterpairing R:
(17) a. (at R (φ ∧ ψ)↔ at Rφ ∧ at Rψ)
b. (at R (¬φ)↔ ¬ at Rφ)
c. (at R (^φ)↔ ∃S(S is accessible from R ∧ at Sφ))
d. (at Rφ→  at Rφ
We can find conditions on counterpairings under which all these prin-
ciples hold, but these go beyond the mere requirement that counter-
pairings be universally defined functions.
The problem with (17a) and (17b) is the initial ‘necessarily’. (16) en-
tails that whenever R is a universally defined function, at R (φ∧ψ)↔
at Rφ ∧ at Rψ and at R (¬φ)↔ ¬ at Rφ. The problem is that even if it
is necessary that all counterpairings are universally defined functions,
it does not follow that each counterpairing is necessarily a universally
defined function. For if the logic of the relevant sense of ‘possible’
is not S5, there can be possible worlds which could have failed to be
possible worlds—in other words, counterpairings which could have
failed to be counterpairings—in other words, counterpairings S such
that for some counterpairing R, R(S) is not a counterpairing. Guar-
anteeing the truth of (17a) and (17b) thus requires not only that every
counterpairing is a universally defined function, but that R(S) is a
universally defined function whenever R and S are counterpairings.
In thinking about what this means, a natural starting point is the
appealing thought that ordered pairs are rigid: whenever z is the
ordered pair of x and y, it is necessarily so. In the context of our
analysis, this is equivalent to
Rigid Pairs Whenever R is a counterpairing, R(〈x, y〉) =
〈R(x),R(y)〉.
Rigid Pairs entails that when R is a counterpairing and S is any
plurality of ordered pairs, an ordered pair is one of R(S) iff it is
〈R(x),R(y)〉 for some 〈x, y〉 that is one of S. That is, R(S)(z1z2) ↔
∃x∃y(Rxz2 ∧ Sxy ∧ Ryz2): in other words, R(S) = R ◦ S ◦ R−1. Thus
if we were to require not only counterpairings but the converses of
counterpairings to be universally defined functions, we would be
guaranteed that R(S) is a universally defined function whenever R
and S are counterpairings. And it is hard to think of any other plau-
sible way to guarantee this. R ◦ S ◦ R−1 will certainly not have a
universal domain unless R−1 does; and unless S is very special, it will
not be functional unless R−1 is. So if ordered pairs are rigid, the desire
to vindicate (17a) and (17b) pushes us towards the view that every
counterpairing is a global permutation—some ordered pairs such that
everything is the first element of exactly one of them, and everything
is the second element of exactly one of them.
The challenge posed by (17c) is to find a meaning for ‘S is accessible
from R’ that makes it true. We can find one by substituting Analysis F*
into our analysis ‘at R ’. In the simple case where the counterpart
relation is qualitative, this is easily done:
at R^φ(t1, . . . , tn)
↔ at R∃Q(CQ ∧ φ(Q(t1), . . . ,Q(tn)))
↔ ∃Q(CQ ∧ φ(Q(R(t1)), . . . ,Q(R(tn))))
↔ ∃Q(CQ ∧ at(Q ◦ R)φ(t1, . . . , tn))
Thus we can accept (17c) provided we understand ‘S is accessible
from R’ to mean ‘there is a counterpairing Q such that S = Q ◦ R’.
If counterpairings are one-to-one, this is equivalent to ‘S ◦ R−1 is a
counterpairing’.40
40What about non-qualitative counterpart relations? Suppose C(S) is analysed
as ψ(a1, . . . , a j,S), where ψ is qualitative and a1 . . . a j are some singular or plural
terms. Then, in the third and fourth lines of the above derivation, instead of
‘C(Q)’ we should have ‘ψ(R(a1), . . . ,R(a j),Q)’; so our analysis of ‘S is accessible
from R’ should be ‘∃Q(ψ(R(a1), . . . ,R(a j),Q) ∧ S = Q ◦ R)’. If counterpairings are
global permutations, then we can express this analysis in terms of C: in that case,
‘∃Q(ψ(R(a1), . . . ,R(a j),Q) ∧ S = Q ◦ R)’ is equivalent to ‘ψ(R(a1), . . . ,R(a j),S ◦ R−1)’,
which is equivalent to ‘ψ(R(a1), . . . ,R(a j),R(R−1(S ◦ R−1)))’, which is equivalent to
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The most difficult to vindicate is (17d). This is an important part of
the standard “possible world” role: much of our ordinary talk about
possible worlds would have to be drastically rethought if facts about
what is the case at a given world could be contingent. But none of the
constraints on counterpairings that we have encountered so far entails
(17d). Worse: the very appealing principle Rigid Pairs entails that
what is the case according to a counterpairing often is contingent. For
Rigid Pairs entails that counterpairings map identity pairs to identity
pairs: if R〈x, x〉〈y, z〉, then y = z. If so, each counterpairing must map
I, the plurality of all identity pairs, to some plurality J of identity
pairs. (If we counterpairings must also have universal ranges, J = I.)
But the conjunction of ‘at Jφ’ with the claim that J consists only of
identity pairs entails φ. Thus for any counterpairing R, if ‘at R (at Iφ)’
is true, then ‘at Rφ’ is true. It is necessary that if at I (φ), then φ.
(And if counterpairings have universal ranges the converse is also
necessary). So whenever it is contingent whether φ, it is contingent
whether at Iφ.41
Thus, to render claims of the form ‘at R (φ)’ non-contingent, coun-
terpairings will have to treat ordered pairs in a strange way that does
not fit with the intuition that they are rigid. Can we do it if we are
prepared to bite this bullet? Yes: it turns out that everything works
out nicely if we assume both (a) that all counterpairings are global
permutations, or at least universally defined, one-to-one functions,
and (b) the following rather odd treatment of ordered pairs:
Semi-Rigid Pairs R(〈x, y〉) = 〈R(x), y〉 for every counterpairing R.
Semi-Rigid Pairs entails that whenever R is a counterpairing and
S is any relation, 〈x, y〉 is one of R(S) iff for some z, Szy and
Rzx. That is, R(S) = S ◦ R−1. Now consider what it means for
‘at R at Sφ(t1, . . . , tn)’ to be true. According to (16), this is equivalent
‘at R C(R−1(S ◦ R−1)))’.
41This objection to the identification of possible worlds with pluralities of ordered
pairs parallels a common objection to Lewis’s identification of properties with sets,
and instantiation with set-membership. Namely: whenever an object is a member
of a set, it is necessary that it is a member of that set (at least if it exists); but it is not
true that whenever an object has a property, it is necessary that it has that property.
to ‘at Rφ(S(t1), . . . ,S(tn))’, and hence to
(18) φ(R(S)(R(t1)), . . . ,R(S)(R(tn))).42
If R is a counterpairing, then by Semi-Rigid Pairs, R(S) = S ◦ R−1,
so R(S)(R(ti)) = (S ◦ R−1)(R(ti)) = S(R−1(R(ti))). And since R is uni-
versally defined and one-to-one, R−1(R(ti)) = ti. (All this is true
whether ti is a singular or plural term.) So (18) is equivalent to
‘φ(S(t1), . . . ,S(tn))’, and hence to ‘at Sφ(t1, . . . , tn)’. We have thus
shown that if ‘at Sφ(t1, . . . , tn)’ is true, ‘at R at Sφ(t1, . . . , tn)’ is true
whenever R is a counterpairing: in that case ‘at Sφ(t1, . . . , tn)’ is nec-
essarily true.
Our previous strategy for vindicating (17a) and (17b) involved com-
bining Rigid Pairs with the claim that counterpairings are global per-
mutations. But this works out just as well if we replace Rigid Pairs
with Semi-Rigid Pairs. If R(S) = S ◦ R−1, then R(S) is a global permu-
tation (and hence a universally defined function) whenever R and S
are.
Nevertheless, the strategy of vindicating (17d) by accepting Semi-
Rigid Pairs takes a lot of getting used to. For the strategy requires facts
about the constitution of counterpairings to be contingent, in a sur-
prising way. For example, the identity pairs I—“the actual world”—
could have failed to comprise all and only identity pairs. Indeed,
they would have failed to do so had anything been otherwise in any
respect! For whenever it is true that φ, it is necessary that at I, φ; and
it is always necessary that (φ iff at whichever pairs are the identity
pairs, φ); hence, whenever it is true that φ, it is necessary that (if not-φ
then I are not the identity pairs). Every counterpairing is the identity
relation at itself: R(R) = R ◦ R−1 = I, since counterpairings are global
permutations. Being the identity relation plays the role, in this theory,
that being actualised plays in the standard possible worlds framework.
We face a dilemma: give up (17d), or give up Rigid Pairs. One way
to deal with this dilemma would be to apply the Lewisian idea that
choices between different ways of referring to the same thing(s) can
42Note that we get the same result if we first eliminate ‘at R ’ to get
‘at R(S)φ(R(t1), . . . ,R(tn))’ and then eliminate ‘at R(S) ’.
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affect the truth value of our modal claims, by affecting the contextu-
ally determined interpretation of ‘counterpairing’ (or in Lewis’s case,
‘counterpart’). Here are some ordered pairs. If we refer to them in one
way—as “these ordered pairs”, say—that will evoke an interpretation
of ‘counterpairing’ on which Rigid Pairs is true. If we refer to them
in a different way—as “a possible world”—that will evoke a different
interpretation of ‘counterpairing’, on which Semi-Rigid Pairs is true,
so that claims about what is the case “at” a given plurality of pairs are
non-contingent. If we try to do both these things in the same breath,
we will be misled into thinking that we are thinking with two distinct
(pluralities of) entities.43
It is worth noting that not all of the theoretical roles we might
want “possible worlds” to play require claims about what is the case
at a world to be non-contingent. For example, this is not required
for a Lewis-style analysis of counterfactual conditionals in terms of
a closeness relation among worlds. Even if we accept Rigid Pairs,
we are free to analyse ‘If it were that φ it would be that ψ’ as ‘Either
there is no counterpairing at which φ, or some counterpairing at
which φ ∧ ψ is closer to the identity relation than any counterpairing
at which φ ∧ ¬ψ’.44 Many of the applications of possible worlds
for which it actually matters that claims about what is the case at a
world should be non-contingent are in formal semantics; and there,
it is not at all obvious that we couldn’t achieve the same explanatory
goals equally well in a framework that didn’t require worlds to work
43Another, less Lewisian, route would be expand our ontology to include several
different kinds of ordered-pair-like objects that can be assigned different modal pro-
files within a single context. As well as pairs, there are pairs*: for all x and y, there
is exactly one pair* whose first member* is x and whose second member* is y. Even
in a context where ordered pairs are rigid, pairs* may not be: Rigid Pairs may be
true if we take ‘〈x, y〉’ to refer to a pair, while Semi-Rigid Pairs is true if we take it to
refer to a pair*. If so, we can identify possible worlds with pluralities of pairs* rather
than pluralities of pairs, and thus assert within a single context that what is the case
according to a world is non-contingent and that ordered pairs have their first and
second elements essentially.
44In fact, if the task is that of analysing counterfactual conditionals in nonmodal
terms, there is no need for a three-place closeness relation, since one of the argument
places will always be saturated by the identity relation: we can simply think in terms
of a two place ‘closer to being actualised than’ relation among counterpairings.
like this. There is one important exception, however, and that is the
application of possible worlds to the task of analysing modal claims
involving ‘actually’ operators—a task that has been a stumbling block
for counterpart theorists up to now, and which is important enough
to deserve its own section.
11 Actuality
Consider Twin, off in some other Lewis-world. He is about six feet
tall. He could have been much shorter than that, say five feet tall.
And if so, he would have been much shorter than he in fact is, since
in fact he is about six feet tall.
‘Actually’ and ‘in fact’ are pretty much synonymous. The way Twin
in fact is is the way he actually is. Once we agree that Twin is about
six feet tall, it would be absurd to deny that he is in fact about six feet
tall. It would be no less absurd to deny that he is actually six feet tall.
Lewis generally uses ‘actual’ as a predicate. He claims that only
things that are in Cosmo are actual; things that are in other Lewis-
worlds are nonactual. ‘Actual’, according to him, is indexical: in our
context its extension includes only things that are parts of Cosmo; as
used by someone in another Lewis-world, its extension includes only
things that in that world.
I’m not quite sure how this adjective ‘actual’ is supposed to relate
to the adverb ‘actually’—I’m not even sure that ‘is actual’, as opposed
to ‘is an actual F’, is grammatical English. But it would certainly be
strange to agree with Lewis that Twin is not actual, while accepting,
as I claimed we must, that he is actually six feet tall. Maybe we should
say to be actual is to be actually identical to something. If so, then for
the same reason that I think we must say that Twin, being six feet tall,
is actually six feet tall, I think we must say that Twin, being identical
to something, is actually identical to something, and thus actual.
If we thought that Lewis-worlds were ways things might be, we
would naturally be led to think that there must be one Lewis-world
that is the way things are, and thus to give this Lewis-world a special
role in the semantics of ‘actual’ and ‘actually’.45 But once we see that
45Lewis says that he ‘would find it very peculiar to say that modality, as ordinarily
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the concept of a Lewis-world plays no special role in the semantics for
modal claims, we will see that this is a mistake. Lewis-worlds, like
everything else, are counterparts, and in that sense represent ways cer-
tain specific things—the things whose counterparts they are—might
be. If the Lewis-worlds are all one another’s counterparts, then each
Lewis-world represents a way any other given Lewis-world might
be.46 There is only one Lewis-world—namely Cosmo itself—that rep-
resents the way Cosmo actually is. But this doesn’t give Cosmo a dis-
tinctive role vis-à-vis actuality: every Lewis-world represents the way
it itself is. pActually φq involves indexical reference to Cosmo only
when φ already involves indexical reference to Cosmo. Since quan-
tification is often tacitly restricted in an indexical way, many claims
which contain no overt indexical words are indexical all the same.
There is no particular reason to think that covert indexical reference
to Cosmo is particularly common among the folk, however, although
it might be more common among certain physicists and philosophers.
So much for what actuality is not. But what is it? What does ‘actu-
ally’ actually mean? Hazen (1979) was the first to notice the difficulty of
extending the counterpart-theoretic translation scheme of Lewis 1968
to a language containing an ‘actually’ operator; Fara and Williamson
(2005) explain why some natural ideas, as well as some more intricate
proposals due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, don’t
succeed in endowing the ‘actually’ operator with anything like the
right logical behaviour.
In a context where Semi-Rigid Pairs holds and counterpairings are
global permutations, this challenge is easily met in the present frame-
work. We can simply analyse pActually φq as pat I (φ)q, where I is a
rigid plural name for the identity pairs. As we have seen, the result
understood, is quantification over parts of actuality. If I were convinced that I ought
to call all the worlds actual. . . then it would become very implausible to say that
what might happen is what does happen at some or another world’ (OPW 100). It
is not obvious how to square this with his allowing (OPW 231–2) that actual objects
can be one another’s counterparts.
46Cf. OPW 230: ‘[A] possible world. . . is a way that an entire world might possibly
be. But lesser possible individuals, inhabitants of worlds, proper parts of worlds,
are possibilities too. They are ways that something less than an entire world might
possibly be.’
turns out to be non-contingent. How could there be such a big differ-
ence between pat( I)(φ)q andφ? Because, in these contexts, it is far from
being necessary that I are all and only the identity pairs. For example,
the identity pair 〈Lewis, Lewis〉 is not necessarily an identity-pair,
since 〈x, Lewis〉 is a counterpart of 〈Lewis, Lewis〉 whenever x is a
counterpart of Lewis. But since all its counterparts have Lewis as
their second member, 〈Lewis, Lewis〉 is necessarily a pair whose sec-
ond member is a philosopher. Likewise, concerning the identity pairs
I, it is not necessary that they are all identity pairs, but it is necessary
that whichever of them has Lewis as a first member has a philosopher
as its second member.
It will be objected that there are at least some contexts where ‘Or-
dered pairs are rigid’ is true, and that the actuality operator makes
sense, and obeys its usual logic, even in these contexts. One could
try to invoke the idea of mid-sentence context-shifting to handle this.
But such a move seems less than fully satisfying: sentences which
employ the actuality operator in the course of expounding the rigid-
ity of ordered pairs, like ‘it is necessary that each ordered pair have
the members it actually has’, certainly don’t have the feel of discourse
that is true only on nonuniform interpretations.
However, if we are prepared to lower our sights a bit, demanding
not a recipe for giving analyses of the form ‘Actually φ↔df . . . ’, but
only a recipe for transforming any given sentence with ‘actually’ and
various other modal operators into a logically equivalent sentence free
of modal operators, we can adapt our previous approach so that we
can do without Semi-Rigid Pairs. The idea is to use as an intermediary
a two-sorted language with a special category of terms which are
stipulated to behave, in modal contexts, the way Semi-Rigid Pairs
requires all terms for relations to behave.
Let me sketch the strategy in a bit more detail. We start with a
languageLACT with the modal operators ,^ and ACT, singular and
plural quantifiers and variables, a predicate C taking one plural ar-
gument, a distinguished plural term I, and the ordered-pair-forming
functor ‘〈·, ·〉’. We will recursively specify a translation function from
LACT into L, the modal-operator-free sublanguage of LACT. Our
translation will use sentences of a third language LW as intermedi-
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aries. LW is like L except that (i) its plural terms can optionally be
underlined, in which case we will call them “world terms”, and (ii) it
contains an operator ‘at’ that takes a world term W and a sentence φ
to make a sentence pat W (φ)q.
The translation from LACT to LW is straightforward: wherever we
have ‘^φ’, we substitute ‘∃V(CV∧at Vφ)’, where V is some new world
variable; wherever we have ‘φ’, we substitute ‘∀V(CV → at V (φ))’;
wherever we have ‘ACTφ’, we substitute ‘at I (φ)’.
The central task in translating from LW to L is to eliminate all
occurrences of the ‘At’ operator. To do so, we replace each formula
of the form ‘at Rφ(t1, . . . , tn)’ with φ(α1, . . . , αn), where αi is pR(ti)q
when ti is a singular term or a non-underlined plural term, and αi
is pti ◦ R−1q when ti is an world term. As usual, we treat sentences
involving complex terms like ‘R(a)’ and ‘S◦R−1’ in Russellian fashion,
as abbreviations for quantified sentences of LW: ‘(S ◦ R−1)ab’, for
example, abbreviates ‘∃Q(∀xy(Qxy ↔ ∃z(Rzx ∧ Szy)) ∧ Qab)’. By
repeatedly applying this rule, we can turn each sentence of LW into
an ‘at’-free sentence. Finally, we can translate this sentence into L
simply by dropping all the underlines.
Here is an example of the machinery at work. Suppose our original
sentence φ of LACT is
(19) ∃x^∃y ACT Fxy.
The translation of (19) into LW is
(20) ∃x∃X(CX ∧ at X (∃y(at I (Fxy)))).
Eliminating the two occurrences of ‘At’ in reverse order yields first
(21) ∃x∃X(CX ∧ at X (∃y(FI(x)I(y))))
and then
(22) ∃x∃X(CX ∧ ∃y(F(I ◦ X−1)(X(x))(I ◦ X−1)(X(y)))).47
(22) can be turned into (an abbreviation of) a formula of L by elim-
inating the underlines. From the premise that counterpairings are
global permutations, we can deduce that this formula is equivalent to
(23) ∃x∃X(CX ∧ ∃yFI(x)I(y)).
and thus, appealing to the further premises that there is at least one
counterpairing and that I is the identity relation, to
(24) ∃x∃yRxy
which is what we want.
This translation yields an orthodox logic for ‘actually’. From the
premises that all counterpairings are global permutations and that I
is a global permutation, it is a straightforward exercise to derive the
following standard axiom-schemas:




All of these are “globally valid” under the standard logic for ‘actually’.
The additional “real-world valid” axiom-schema
ACTφ↔ φ
follows if we add the further premise that I is the identity relation.48
47Note that we would get the same result if we eliminated the occurrences in the
opposite order.
48To assure ourselves properly that the translations defined above deliver the
orthodox logic for ‘actually’ in its entirety, we need to venture into model theory.
Let a model for L be a pair of a domain D and interpretation function I, except
that we require D to be closed under taking ordered pairs, and require I(〈t1, t2〉) to
equal 〈I(t1),I(t2)〉. Truth in a model is defined as usual. Let a model for LACT be a
quintuple 〈W, <,D,J ,w@〉, where W is any nonempty set, < any relation on W,D is
any nonempty set, J is a function from W to interpretation functions over D (that
treats names as rigid), and w@ is a member of W. To the standard recursive definition
of truth in S relative to w, we add the clause that pACTφq is true at any world iff φ is
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Note that allowing counterpairings that are not global permutations
would make the logic go haywire. Consider the simple formula (25),
which should be true:
(25) ^ACT Fa↔ Fa.
The translation of (25) into L is
(26) ∃W(CW ∧ F(I ◦W−1)(W(a)))↔ Fa.
Given our narrow-scope Russellian treatment of complex terms, (26)
is false if any counterpairing W maps a to nothing or to two different
things, or maps a to something to which it also maps some distinct
object b. Indeed, just as the necessity of identity follows from Leibniz’s
Law, the necessity of distinctness follows from the standard logic for
“actually” together with Leibniz’s Law (understood so as to apply
within the scope of “actually” as elsewhere). By LL, (a = b →
(ACT a = a ↔ ACT a = b); so by the reflexivity of identity, (a = b →
ACT a = b; so if it is possible that a = b, it is possible that ACT a = b,
and so a = b.49 So it is no surprise that recovering the standard
true at w@. A formula ofLACT is said to be globally valid (relative to a class of models)
iff it is true at every world in every model in the class, and real-world valid relative to
a class of models iff it is true at w@ in every model in the class. (The terminology is
from Crossley and Humberstone 1977.)
We want to show that the translation function described above maps each globally
valid formula of LACT to a consequence in L of ‘every counterpairing is a global
permutation and so is I’, and maps every real-world valid formula to a consequence
in L of ‘every counterpairing is a global permutation and I is the identity relation’.
We do so by constructing an appropriate model SM = 〈W, <,D,J ,w@〉 for LACT,
given as input a modelM = 〈D,I〉 for L in which ‘every counterpairing is a global
permutation and so is I’ is true. W is the set of permutations of D. For an atomic
predicate F, J(pi)(F) = pi−1(I(F)). pi1 < pi2 iff pi−11 ◦ pi2 ∈ I(C). w@ = I(I). It can
then be proved that a sentence of LACT is true at the identity in SM iff its translation
into L is true in M. This entails that (i) if the translation of a sentence into L is
false in some model ofL in which ‘every counterpairing is a global permutation and
so is I’ is true, the sentence is false at a world in SM, and thus not globally valid;
and (ii) if the translation of a sentence into L is false in some model of L in which
‘every counterpairing is a global permutation and I is the identity relation’ is true,
the sentence is false at w@ in SM, and thus not real-world valid.
49This argument is due to Williamson (1996).
logic for ‘actually’ involves requiring counterpairings to be one-to-
one. Similarly, if counterpairings could fail to have universal ranges,
the translation (28) of (27) would not be valid, as it ought to be.
∀x(Fx→ ACT^Fx)(27)
∀W(CW → ∀x(Fx→ ∃V(CV ∧ FV((I ◦W−1)(x)))))(28)
It is important to understand the difference between the sense in
which this theory provides an explanation of sentences involving
‘Actually’ and the sense in which the counterpart theory of section 8
provides an explanation of claims of the form ‘Possibly φ’. The latter
can be viewed as a collection of analyses, English sentences of the
form ‘For it to be possible that φ is for it to be the case that . . . ’.
Our “translations” of claims involving ‘actually’ are not like this. The
translation of ‘Actually Mars is red’ is ‘I(Mars) is red’, i.e. ‘The object
that is the second member of the ordered pair that is one of I and has
Mars as its first member is red’. Suppose Rigid Pairs is true in our
current context. Then ‘Necessarily, I is the identity relation’ is also true
in our current context, and so is ‘Necessarily, Mars is red iff I(Mars)
is red’. But even in this context, ‘Necessarily, Mars is red iff Mars is
actually red’ is false. So in this context at least, we can’t accept the
analysis ‘For Mars to be actually red is for I(Mars) to be red’. We could
accept this analysis if we understood it not as a sentence of English
but as a sentence of a three-sorted language standing to English as
LW stands to LACT. But then again, while the three-sorted language
can in some sense be translated into English, these translations don’t
seem to work like analyses.
Does this mean that modal realists are after all are forced to accept
“primitive modality” in the form of the ‘actually’ operator? I think
not. It is a familiar point that the philosopher’s ‘actually’ is impov-
erished by comparison with comparable devices in natural language.
Actual sentences using ‘actually’ seem to exhibit something akin to
scope ambiguity: it can locally undo some but not all of the modal
operators in whose scope it occurs. For example, ‘Necessarily, every-
one could have had a child he doesn’t actually have’ is naturally read
as inconsistent with the claim that possibly, some parent x has a child
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y and could not have had any child other than y. It is easy to de-
vise formal languages with ‘actually’-like operators that exhibit this
flexible behaviour. For example, we can have a modal language L↑↓
with a pair of operators ↑ and ↓, each taking a numerical subscript:
↑i functions like a label for a world which occurrences of ↓i within its
scope can refer back to.50 The sentence above can then be symbolised
as follows:
↑1∀x^∃y(y is a child of x ∧ ↓1¬(y is a child of x)).
It is a straightforward matter to extend our translation scheme for
‘actually’ to this more flexible language. We use a stock of world
variables W1,W2,W3 . . .. In going from L↑↓ to LW, we replace ‘↓i . . .’
with ‘at Wi (. . .)’, and we replace ‘↑i . . .’ with ∃Wi(Wi are the identity
pairs ∧ . . .). The translation from LW to L proceeds as before.
There is a clear sense in whichL↑↓ has more expressive power than
LACT. We can translate from LACT to L↑↓ by prefixing each sentence
with ↑1, and replacing each occurrence of ACT with ↓1; there is no
comparable translation that maps every sentence ofL↑↓ to a sentence
of LACT. But in dealing with L↑↓, there is no particular temptation
to treat sentences that contain occurrences of ↓i that are not within
the scope of ↑i as expressing propositions in their own right. While
‘↓17 Mars is red’ is meaningful—it makes a distinctive contribution
to the meaning of larger sentences that embed it—its meaning, like
that of the open sentence ‘x is red’, is not a matter of its expressing a
particular proposition. Thus, ‘What is it for it to be the case that ↓17
Mars is red?’ doesn’t look like a good question; our inability to answer
it nontrivially does not amount to “taking ↓17 as primitive”. The
situation with ACT is, I suggest, similar. The semantic contribution
of a sentence involving ACT is not properly thought of as a matter
of its expressing a proposition, so the quest for an analysis of these
sentences is misguided. (Of course we can use these sentences to assert
propositions, just as we can use sentences with free variables to assert
50For operators that work in similar ways see, e.g., Vlach 1973, Fine 1977, Hodes
1984, Williamson MS. Under certain circumstances, the numerical subscripts can
be dispensed with. But they are convenient, as they make the statement of the
translation into LW easier.
propositions.) Once we understand the sense in which everything
that can be said using ‘actually’ can be said using ‘↑1’ and ‘↓1’, and we
know how to analyse sentences using ↑1 and ↓1 in nonmodal terms,
we have achieved everything the reductionist should want.
12 Surprising dependencies across Lewis-worlds
Consider a very detailed qualitative property with just one instance in
the whole of reality, which does not overlap our Lewis-world. Call the
property ‘F-ness’ and its instance ‘Felix’. Suppose that I could have
been F, i.e. that Felix is one of my counterparts. Given the necessity of
distinctness—a principle which, as we have seen, we must embrace
if we want a reasonable logic for ‘actually’—it is necessary that I am
not Felix. Since the claim that exactly one thing is F is also necessary,
being purely qualitative, it follows that it is necessary that if I am F,
Felix is not F. If it is possible for me to be F, it must be possible for Felix
not to be F. This is all true for any notion of possibility whatsoever,
even quite narrowly restricted ones. There is something rather odd
here. For suppose we are talking about historical possibility as of t,
where t is some instant of time in Cosmo. Then the fact that Felix is
F is historically contingent as of t, despite the fact that Felix bears no
temporal relation at all to t. This seems odd.
Counterfactuals about me and Felix raise similar issues. If it is
metaphysically necessary that if I am F, Felix isn’t, it follows that if I
were F, Felix wouldn’t have been. This is odd too. Since Felix and I
stand in no spatiotemporal or analogically spatiotemporal relations,
it is hard to see how we could be causally related; but this makes the
relation of counterfactual dependence rather mysterious. So far, at
least, we have seen no reason to rule out the possibility that I could
have made myself be F with minimal effort, say by raising my arm
a little bit. But I have no miraculous powers to reach across the gulf
between Lewis-worlds, so how could it be true that if I had raised my
arm, Felix would have failed to be F?
If we embraced the “two languages” picture, according to which
modal operators cannot meaningfully be applied to formulae involv-
ing unrestricted quantification, we might be tempted to dismiss ques-
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tions like ‘Was it historically possible at t for Felix not to be F?’ and
‘What would Felix have been like if I had been F?’ as involving a sim-
ilar kind of illegitimacy. Perhaps the mysterious repulsive force that
prevents modal operators from attaching meaningfully to sentences
with unrestricted quantifiers also prevents them from attaching to
sentences involving terms for objects outside Cosmo. I have already
explained why this is a bad picture for unrestricted quantifiers; its
extension to terms for objects outside Cosmo is clearly no better.
Perhaps it would not be so bad simply to accept the oddities. We can
note, for example, that the extent of the counterfactual dependence
between me and Felix is very limited: there is no reason to suppose
that there is a range of different ways I could have been such that for
if I had been any of these ways, Felix would have been qualitatively
different in some corresponding way. So I doubt there is a serious
worry here for counterfactual analyses of causation: it should not
be hard to craft an analysis of causation on which this one isolated
counterfactual involving me and Felix is consistent with the absence
of causation.51
Nevertheless, it would be nice if modal realists could avoid these
surprising conclusions altogether. And they can, provided that they
commit themselves to an ontological claim about which Lewis was
agnostic (OPW 224 n. 17):
Reduplication Every Lewis-world, and hence every part
of a Lewis-world, is qualitatively indiscernible from in-
finitely many other things.
If Reduplication is true, then the only uniquely instantiated qual-
itative properties are those whose instances span infinitely many
Lewis-worlds. But if being F requires spanning infinitely many Lewis-
worlds, it is not plausible that it is historically possible at t that I am
F, or that I could easily have been F just by raising my arm, or any-
thing like that. Indeed, given Reduplication, we are free to maintain
that whenever φ(x) (where ‘φ’ is qualitative) and x is not in Cosmo,
it is historically necessary at t that φ(x). For we can stipulate that
51Lewis (2000) gives a counterfactual analysis on which such considerations play
an important role.
for a global permutation to be a counterpairing in the sense relevant
to historical possibility at t, counterpairing, it must map every object
not in the same Lewis-world as t onto a qualitatively indiscernible
object. Given Reduplication, a counterpairing can satisfy this condi-
tion while mapping objects that are in the same Lewis-world as t onto
any worldbound objects it pleases. If we want to map a to b, we can
map the infinitely many qualitative duplicates of b onto the things
that are qualitative duplicates of b and distinct from b—like the guests
in Hilbert’s Hotel, they can always make room for one more—while
mapping the things that are qualitative duplicates of a and distinct
from a onto the things that are qualitative duplicates of a.52
Incidentally, modal realists who accept Reduplication can avail
themselves of a novel response to the objections considered by Lewis
in OPW §2.6 (‘A Road to Indifference?’). There, Lewis grants that the
conjunction of modal realism with strict, agent-neutral consequen-
tialism entails that no-one ever acts wrongly, or has reason to do
anything, since ‘[t]here would be the same sum total of good and of
evil throughout the worlds’, no matter how we act. But there are
versions of consequentialism that can give substantive advice even
on the assumption that the total amount of goodness (and evil) is
infinite, and will be infinite no matter what we do. For example,
consequentialists who follow Kagan and Vallentyne (1997) will make
claims like this: if for each living being x and interval of time t, x
would be at least as well off during t if you did action A as it would
be if you did anything else, and there is at least one x and t such that
x would be better off during t if you did A than it would be if you did
anything else, then you ought to do A. This principle seems quite in
52Things would be even neater if we strengthened Reduplication to the claim that
absolutely everything has infinitely many qualitative duplicates. But this would require
some very unorthodox mereology. Classical mereology entails that there is exactly
one fusion of all blue things—since being a fusion of all blue things is a qualitative
property, this fusion cannot have any qualitative duplicates. Even opponents of
classical mereology might balk at the idea that the blue things have infinitely many
fusions which differ solo numero. But there is nothing especially counterintuitive
about the claim that if I had fused the blue things, the thing that actually fuses
the blue things would not have fused the blue things. What seemed puzzling was
the claim that even my instantiating quite “close” qualitative profiles would require
objects spatiotemporally separated from me to change their qualitative properties.
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keeping with the spirit of universalistic ethics. And a modal realist
who endorses it can claim that there are some things we ought not to
do: for if life will be better for people in Cosmo if I do A than if I do B,
and everyone outside Cosmo will have exactly the same qualitative
properties whether I do A or B, it will follow that I ought not do B.
According to Lewis,
If I had acted otherwise, for instance by taking to a life of
crime, each and every good or evil that is present somewhere
in the totality of worlds would still have been present, and
none would have been added. It is wrong to think: then this
world would have been a little worse, and the rest would
have been no different, so the totality of worlds would have
been a little worse.
I am suggesting that the thought Lewis rejects is perfectly fine. Even
though totality of worlds could not have been qualitatively different
from the way it actually is, given Reduplication, it can still be possible
for some parts of the totality to be better while the rest are no worse.53
Should modal realists accept Reduplication? I’m not going to say.
My aim has been to identify the optimal modal realist analysis of
modal claims, not to advise those who accept this analysis about
when they should and should not endorse the surprising ontological
claims they will believe to follow various intuitive modal judgments.
But Lewis, at least, seems generally happy to accept extravagant on-
tological claims when doing so is required for holding onto modal
intuitions, even intuitions of a fairly subtle sort. Given this over-
all policy, acceptance of Reduplication seems a fair price to pay to
vindicate the ordinary intuition that if there are objects spatiotempo-
rally disconnected from us, their qualitative properties are fixed and
entirely beyond our control.54
53If we accept the necessity of existence, we will have to agree with Lewis that it
is true of each good and evil that it would have existed no matter what I had done.
But we need not be worried: we can say that some of these goods would be better,
and some of the evils less evil, if I did A than if I did B, and we can also say (if we
like Williamson’s idea of contingent concreteness) that some things that would be
nonconcrete if I did A would be concrete evils if I did B, and that some things that
would be concrete goods if I did A would be nonconcrete if I did B.
54There is also a promising argumentative route to Reduplication from an onto-
13 Metaphysical modality
Our counterpart-theoretic analyses purport to represent all of the
many things that ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’ can mean in a context, or
at least some large class of these meanings. What should one think, if
one accepts some such analysis, about uses of ‘possibly’ and ‘neces-
sarily’ by philosophers? Metaphysicians who are trying to explain what
they up to when they argue about “metaphysical necessity” often give
a little speech where they explain that the notion they have in mind
is in some sense maximally strong. Thus Kripke:
. . . [C]haracteristic theoretical identifications like ‘Heat is the
motion of molecules’, are not contingent truths but necessary
truths, and here of course I don’t mean just physically nec-
essary, but necessary in the highest degree—whatever that
means. (Kripke 1972: p. 99)
And Peter van Inwagen:
A proposition is physically possible if its conjunction with
the laws of nature is . . . well, possible. Possible tout court.
logical claim that Lewis definitely did endorse, namely the “principle of recombina-
tion”. The relevant ideas are assembled by Bricker (1993), though he uses them for
a different purpose. First, we need the claim, which follows from the principle of
recombination (OPW 88), that everything has a duplicate that is “lonely”—a Lewis-
world or fusion of Lewis-worlds. Second, we need the idea that objects in the same
Lewis-world can be linked by chains of perfectly natural relations rather than linked
directly by perfectly natural relations: this means that parts of Lewis-worlds can
have duplicates spanning multiple Lewis-worlds. Third, we need an idea which we
get from the principle of recombination: that for every part of a Lewis-world, there
is a Lewis-world containing infinitely many spatially separated duplicates of it. (We
needn’t worry that this would be ruled out by the proviso ‘size and shape permit-
ting’: we can always, e.g., arrange the duplicates along a new dimension “like a stack
of flatlands in three-space” (OPW 72).) Fourth, we need the idea that some of these
worlds are ones in which spatially separated objects are not connected directly by
any perfectly natural spatiotemporal relations, but only by chains of such relations.
If a world of this sort contains infinitely many spatially separated duplicate objects,
then any lonely duplicate of the fusion of these objects will be a fusion of infinitely
many duplicate Lewis-worlds. Putting all this together, we can infer that everything
that is in a Lewis-world has infinitely many lonely duplicates. It is a very small step
from this to Reduplication.
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Possible simpliciter. Possible period. Explanations come to an
end somewhere. I can say only that by possibility I mean
possibility without qualification. If there were no such thing
as modality without qualification, there could be no qualified
modalities like physical and biological possibility and neces-
sity. If we understand “qualified” modal statements (of any
sort), we must understand “unqualified” modal statements.
(van Inwagen 1998: p. 72)
Remarks like these do much to constrain the interpretation of meta-
physicians’ talk of possibility and necessity. Suppose that, after going
in for some of this table-thumping, a metaphysician says something of
the form ‘necessarily φ’ which, according to you, is true in some con-
texts and false in others. Normally, considerations of charity would
push you toward interpreting the speaker as asserting the true thing.
But given that modifiers like ‘without qualification’ and ‘in the high-
est degree’ are getting thrown around, it is plain that by following
charity in this way, you would be wilfully misconstruing the meta-
physician as saying something weaker than what she in fact is saying.
Given the clarificatory remarks that have been offered, you have no
choice but to go for the strongest possible interpretation of the claim.
This means you may end up interpreting the metaphysician as saying
something you think obviously false. In general, we worry that we are
misunderstanding people when we interpret them as asserting obvi-
ous falsehoods; but such considerations are much weaker when the
people we are interpreting are philosophers, doing what philosophers
do, which notoriously often involves denying the obvious.
Given a broadly counterpart-theoretic analysis of modal claims,
adopting the strongest possible interpretation of ‘necessarily’ means
adopting the weakest possible interpretation of ‘counterpart’ or ‘coun-
terpairing’.55 Does that mean that we have to take every sequence to
be a counterpart of every other sequence, or take every relation to be
a counterpairing? No. For considerations of logic may push us not
to do so even when we are interpreting modal talk in metaphysical
contexts. The strongest meaning an operator on propositions could
55Cf. Lewis: ‘In the broadest sense, all possible individuals without exception are
possibilities for me’ (OPW 234).
have is one that turns every proposition whatsoever into a falsehood;
but obviously metaphysicians’ speeches about “unrestrictedness” and
“absoluteness” are not a good reason to assign this trivial interpreta-
tion to ‘necessarily’ in their mouths. Talk of maximality is restricted
to some reasonably natural class of meanings, and one thing that
this class of meanings should have in common is their basic logical
behaviour. We should not carry our policy of preferring stronger in-
terpretations of metaphysicians’ ‘necessary’ to weaker ones so far as
to overturn logical principles which even the metaphysicians rely on
in reasoning with their concept.
Leibniz’s Law, understood so as to apply in modal contexts, is
one such principle; like everything in logic, it is controversial, but
those who reject it have to struggle to stop themselves from slipping
into it in spite of themselves. I have already explained why I am
not convinced by Lewis’s arguments against it. For the counterpart
theorist, then, there is good reason to think that even in the very
weak sense of ‘counterpairing’ appropriate in metaphysical contexts,
all counterpairings are functions. Similarly, the foundational role
played by K gives us reason to think that all counterpairings are
universally defined. Another source of constraints is the logic of the
actuality operator: even metaphysicians are comfortable using such
operators and reasoning with them in the standard way. And as we
saw in section 11, a logically well-behaved ‘actually’ operator can
be introduced into the counterpart-theoretic framework only if we
require all counterpairings to be global permutations.
Unless we can find some further constraint, then, we should con-
clude that the sense of ‘counterpairing’ appropriate to metaphysical
contexts applies to all and only global permutations. All the axioms
listed in 1 are valid on this interpretation. This pretty much includes
all the “logical” principles about metaphysical modality that have
every been taken seriously.
If that’s how metaphysical possibility is analysed, all kinds of
strange things are metaphysically possible. For example, it is meta-
physically possible for me to be a poached egg. My unit set is such
that it is metaphysically possible for me not to be a member of it. Con-
troversial stuff! Counterintuitive? Perhaps; it is not so clear which
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of our pre-theoretic opinions about what is and isn’t “possible” are
opinions about the absolutely unqualified notion of possibility that
metaphysicians care about. In any case, it’s not exactly a novel situ-
ation for modal realists to find themselves disagreeing with common
sense about “absolutely unrestricted” claims, while agreeing that they
are true in various restricted senses.
Lewis thinks, with good reason, that modal claims are highly
context-sensitive. But he also thinks that a substantial amount of
context-sensitivity remains in play even when we are doing meta-
physics, in spite of the kinds of clarificatory remarks offered by the
likes of Kripke and van Inwagen:
. . . I suggest that those philosophers who preach that origins
are essential are absolutely right—in the context of their own
preaching. They make themselves right: their preaching
constitutes a context in which de re modality is governed y
a way of representing (as I think, by a counterpart relation)
that requires match of origins. (OPW 252)
While Lewis generally takes it for granted that the accessibility relation
that is relevant in metaphysical contexts is the trivial relation on which
every Lewis-world is accessible from every Lewis-world, he takes a
very different view about the counterpart relation. Even if we thought
that an accessibility relation on Lewis-worlds was needed in addition
to a counterpart relation for the general analysis of modal claims, it
would be hard to justify a differential treatment of the two relations.56
And once we see that we don’t, there is no plausible way to understand
the putative absoluteness of the metaphysicians’ sense of ‘possibly’
save as invoking a maximally weak counterpart relation. For the
counterpart theorist to interpret Kripke as asserting something true in
his context when he says ‘it is impossible for anything to have different
origins’, by invoking a less-than-universal counterpart relation, is as
perverse as, say, interpreting Shoemaker (1998) as saying something
true in his context when he says ‘the laws of nature are necessary’, by
taking him to be talking about merely nomological necessity.
56Lewis is fully aware that accessibility and counterparthood are close cousins:
see OPW 8, 234, 248. This makes the differential treatment all the more surprising.
14 Beyond counterpart theory
The counterpart theoretic analyses of ppossibly φq and pnecessarily
φq are supposed to apply only when φ is couched in a special well-
behaved language, in which the job of referring to particular things
is done exclusively by what I have been calling “terms”—expressions
that occupy syntactic positions that can also be occupied by singular
or plural variables. Not all English sentences are like this. For ex-
ample, to be a German is—roughly—to be a person from Germany.
And necessarily every person from Germany is spatiotemporally re-
lated to Germany. It follows that necessarily every German is spa-
tiotemporally related to Germany. But if, ignoring the requirement
of well-behavedness, we applied the counterpart-theoretic analysis
to this sentence, we would get ‘Every Germans is spatiotemporally
related to every counterpart of Germany’, which is false, assuming
Germany has counterparts in other Lewis-worlds.
Thus no plausible counterpart theory can take the form of an algo-
rithm for providing analyses of arbitrary English sentences of the form
pPossibly φq. The first step in providing an analysis of such a sentence
is to find a well-behaved analysis of φ; only then can the algorithm
be applied. And this first step is by no means straightforward. For
example, it is controversial whether predicates like ‘is a swan’ and ‘is
a donkey’ belong in the well-behaved language, and if not, how they
should be analysed in terms of it. Some think that swanhood and
donkeyhood are qualitative matters: Lewis assumes this when he is
discussing what it is for it to be possible for there to be blue swans
or talking donkeys. Others may think that to be a donkey is to be a
certain kind of descendant of some particular object, say Old Father
Donkey; or that to be a donkey is to be a certain kind of part of some
particular object, say Equus Asinus, understood as a large scattered
material object. We can’t use counterpart theory to explain what it
is for it to be possible for there to be a talking donkey until we have
chosen a side in this dispute.
I don’t see this as a problem: surely a uniform algorithm for
analysing all English sentences of the form pPossibly φq in nonmodal
terms would be too much to hope for. I am emphasising this point
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for two reasons. The first is ad hominem. A central contrast Lewis
draws between his own view and “linguistic ersatzism” (OPW sec-
tion 3.2) is that the linguistic ersatzer, unlike Lewis, must appeal to
“primitive modality” in explaining how it is that certain very detailed
propositions about the arrangement of point particles entail, or are in-
consistent with, the proposition that there are talking donkeys. There
are two thoughts. The first is that specifying, as opposed to gesturing
at, an extensionally adequate linguistic erstazist theory of modality
would require a huge, perhaps infinite, set of “connecting axioms”
relating macro to micro descriptions. The second is subtler:
The job was to analyse modality. . . . It was not also part of
the job to analyse ‘talking donkey’. But [the linguistic er-
satzer] did; for he needed axioms that would tell him, for
every possible arrangement of particles, whether or not that
arrangement would make there be a talking donkey.. . . Why
should the analysis of modality have to wait on that? Surely it
ought to be possible to take ‘talking donkey’ and whatnot as
primitive when we are analysing modality, whatever other
project we might care to undertake on another day. That’s
how I do it: I say it’s possible for there to be a talking don-
key iff some world has a talking donkey as part—no utopian
analysis of ‘talking donkey’ in terms of arrangements of par-
ticles is required. (OPW 156)
The claim at the end rests on the controversial assumption that ‘talking
donkey’ is qualitative. Once we give that up, we see that Lewis and
the linguistic ersatzer are in structurally similar situations: to say what
it is for it to be possible that there is a talking donkey, both require
analyses of ‘talking donkey’ in terms of some favoured vocabulary—
the language of “arrangements of particles” in the ersatzer’s case, the
“well-behaved” language in Lewis’s. It may not be utopian to hope
that we can find the kind of analysis Lewis needs, but as I have pointed
out, it is far from straightforward.
The second, and more important reason for dwelling on this point
is to draw attention to a larger class of programmes for analysing
modality which are like counterpart theory except that they involve
a different specification of the “well-behaved” language to which the
algorithm is to be applied. Consider Lewis’s unit set: call it Lucky.
Suppose for example that you think that what it is for Lucky to contain
a philosopher is for Lewis to be a philosopher. Then you will think it
is necessary—absolutely, unrestrictedly, necessary—that Lucky con-
tains a philosopher iff Lewis is a philosopher. So you can’t accept
counterpart theory. But you might still consider accepting a theory
like counterpart theory, except that it applies only to sentences in a
more restrictive language in which the only non-qualitative expres-
sions are terms referring to non-sets. Moreover, if you think that every
sentence can be analysed in terms of such a language, you may think
that this restriction of counterpart theory tells the full story about the
meaning of modal operators, just as counterpart theorists think their
theory tells the full story about the meaning of modal operators de-
spite the fact that not every sentence is well-behaved. This thought
can be taken quite far. Even if you believe that ordinary objects are
involved in all kinds of interesting de re metaphysical necessities, you
might think that there are some special objects—elementary particles,
say—such that (i) there are no interesting de re metaphysical necessi-
ties involving them, and (ii) every sentence has an analysis (perhaps
infinitary) in which the only referring terms refer to them. (The view
is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.) Then you may still accept
the restriction of counterpart theory to these sentences, and think of
this restriction as telling the full story about the meaning of modal op-
erators. Granted, the project of finding analyses of ordinary claims in
terms of sentences about “combinatorial atoms” is vastly more diffi-
cult than the project of finding analyses of ordinary claims in terms of
the counterpart-theorist’s well-behaved language. But the difference
seems to be one of degree, not of kind.
Alongside these restrictions of counterpart theory, we can also con-
sider extensions of counterpart theory which, in analysing ppossiblyφq
and pnecessarily φq, apply counterpart theory-style transformations
to other syntactically simple constituents of φ besides singular and
plural terms—predicates, for example. One suggestion would be to
treat predicates on the model of plural terms; but this would lead
to an unwanted rigidity—simple subject-predicate sentences could
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never be contingent. A straightforward way to avoid this is simply
to drop the restriction on the variables that stand in for predicates, so
that we get analyses like
(29) It is metaphysically possible that Fa ∧ Gb ↔df
∃R∃x∃y∃X∃Y(R is a global permutation ∧Rax ∧ Rby ∧
Xx ∧ Yy).
In the special case where φ contains no terms, the result is akin to
Tarski’s theory of logical possibility: ‘^φ’ is equivalent to the result
of replacing all the predicates in φ with corresponding higher-order
variables bound by an initial existential quantifier.57
Of course one would get wildly implausible results if one applied
this analysis indiscriminately to English sentences. This would result
in analysing ‘Possibly a is married and a bachelor’ as ‘∃R∃x∃X∃Y(R
is a global permutation and Rax and Xx and not Yx)’, which is true.
(29) is defensible as an analysis of metaphysical possibility only if φ
is required to be in some very special language—one whose predi-
cates are all completely independent of one another. Perhaps, if we
make enough progress in physics and/or metaphysics, we will be able
to identify a language which we could plausibly claim to have this
property. And even if we have not yet done this, we might think, with
the logical atomists, that it must be possible in principle to analyse
everything in terms of such a language. If we did think this, we could
think of the analysis of possibility-claims in the special language as
telling us the full story about the meaning of ‘possibly’. Daunting
as the project of analysing ordinary claims in terms of the special
language may be, as before, the difference between this theory and
Lewisian counterpart theory still seems to be just a matter of degree.58
57Cf. the treatment of referential terms in Fine 2005, and the domain-free treatment
of quantifiers in Williamson 2000.
58The analysis given in (29) is just a gesture towards a theory: there are big
problems we would need to face up to if we really wanted to work out a view of
this sort. The most serious involves the treatment of actuality. If we just forget
about counterpairings in the treatment of predicates, we can no longer use them in
the analysis of ‘actually’ to get things like ‘Fa ↔ ^ACT Fa’ to come out true. If we
wanted to rectify this while still adopting something like the approach of section 11,
we would have to introduce some third-order analogue of counterpairings. It is not
Unlike counterpart theory, these extensions need not validate sen-
tences of the form ‘If possibly φ, then φ’ even for purely qualitative
φ. They leave us free to maintain, for example, that there are no blue
swans, golden mountains, or mutually attractive electrons, although
there could have been all of these things. They allow us to main-
tain that the totality of all concrete objects could have been big and
interesting even though it is actually small and (relatively speaking)
dull. They do not, however, allow us to maintain that there could
have been, more things than there in fact are, unrestrictedly speak-
ing. Getting that to come out true on a reductive analysis of modality
would require resources of a very different kind from those used by
the modal realist.59
obvious whether the kind of higher-order quantification we would need to make this
work is something one can legitimately appeal to in a properly reductive account of
modality.
59Thanks to Daniel Deasy, John Hawthorne, Will Lanier, Ofra Magidor, Kevin
Mulligan, Tim Williamson and Alastair Wilson, and to audiences in Oxford, Geneva,
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